Abstract
Why do states engage in wars for which they are un(der)prepared? Specifically, why do states enter wars when they have good reason to expect that they will not be able to achieve their strategic objectives with their chosen war plans? To understand why states would go to war with flawed plans, we need to know two things: (1) what options to modify the flawed initial war plan were available, and (2) how states pick among their available options. I argue that civilian-military buck-passing restricts the options states have to modify their war plans. Furthermore, the limits on a state’s latent power and the extent of its actualized military power affects how the state selects among their restricted options. These arguments are illustrated through an examination of German war planning in World War II. Germany revised their war plans to fix expected flaws for Fall Gelb, but went to war with a plan known to be flawed in Operation Barbarossa.
Panel: Conceptualizing Military Strategy: From Planning to War