Abstract
NATO’s new operational concept Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) assumes combining various military and non-military tools is essential and beneficial for winning future wars. In this article, we offer a historical perspective to enunciate the MDO’s underlying philosophy. Specifically, we argue that combining tools is not inherently necessary nor beneficial, and that prioritisation of one tool can prove contextually meaningful. To substantiate our claim, we describe how prioritisation prevailed over combination in different historical contexts and especially in the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-2025). Our argument does not imply that prioritization is always preferable, nor that it will prove decisive in future warfare. However, it suggests that NATO should treat prioritisation seriously, and avoid assuming that it will automatically prevail over its adversaries merely by virtue of combining tools. In addition to its practical implications, the argument also improves our theoretical understanding of grand strategy, strategy, and tactics, thus contributing to the current academic debates on these subjects.
Panel: Conceptualizing Military Strategy: From Planning to War