Abstract
For seven decades, American policymakers have been adamant that the US security guarantee and nuclear umbrella both pacified intra-European rivalries and deterred external attacks on Europe. However, a closer examination of US behavior towards Europe since the end of the Cold War in fact shows that US grand strategy is more puzzling than it seems. Despite the US and European allies sharing values and interests and the absence of a common threat, the US government still undermined attempts at European strategic autonomy at various points. Washington could have seen European efforts towards autonomy as an opportunity to pass the costs of European security rather than a risk, yet a desire for control seems to have been driving US behavior. The question of American motives is only more relevant again, now that European allies are confronted with an age of American ambivalence about its alliance commitments in Europe and Asia. Arguments in favor of retrenchment have increasingly become part of both public and academic debates, most obviously in President Trump’s undiplomatic language. Indeed, President Trump has changed the debate in Europe on European autonomy, including deterrence. This paper looks at whether, when, and how attitudes of past and current American officials towards Europe have changed or are changing. It takes into account structural pressures, domestic politics, and the emergence of new ideas in American strategic thinking.
Panel: The Past, Present and Future of Transatlantic Security
Cite this presentation
@inproceedings{eiss-2019-inhibition-or-control-european-autonomy-and-us-grand-strategy,
author = {Paul van Hooft},
title = {Inhibition or Control: European Autonomy and US Grand Strategy},
booktitle = {European Security Studies Conference 2019},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-inhibition-or-control-european-autonomy-and-us-grand-strategy.html}
}