Abstract
In 2020, the United States deployed the W76 2 low-yield nuclear warhead on its ballistic missile submarines, marking a pivotal shift in a contentious, three decade Congressional debate over the role of low-yield nuclear weapons in U.S. nuclear policy. Congress first banned research and development on such weapons in 1993, partially repealed that prohibition in 2004, and then authorized an operational capability in 2018. Drawing on the Congressional record, policy documents, and contemporaneous media reporting as samples of elite discourse, this article examines why legislative approval emerged only in 2018, despite sustained interest in low-yield nuclear weapons within the U.S. defense establishment. The analysis shows that changing threat perceptions were decisive: When U.S. national security discourse emphasized rogue states and terrorism, legislators viewed the strategic rationale for low-yield nuclear weapons as unconvincing and their potential employment against non nuclear adversaries as reckless. As great power competition reasserted itself—especially concerns regarding limited Russian nuclear first use—the defense establishment could successfully reframe low-yield capabilities as necessary for credible nuclear deterrence, enabling Congressional authorization. The article concludes that as long as strategic competition with other major nuclear powers structures U.S. nuclear weapons policy, political support for expanding nuclear response options is likely to endure.
Panel: Military Transformation: Military Innovation and Strategic Change in the Transatlantic Context