Abstract
Cyberspace is a new domain of state security competition that differs from the conventional and nuclear realms, most notably because states are constantly engaged in cyberspace operations below the threshold of armed attacks. This inclines many scholars to use new approaches, both theoretically and empirically, to measure and explain cyber state behaviour. This paper argues that classical neorealist literature, which assumes that geographic features and military resources predict state behaviour, is applicable to the new realm. Building on this, it proposes that the power position of a state, co-constituted by its vulnerability and resources, can explain offensive or defensive behaviour in cyberspace. The paper maps 31 states engaged in cyber security competition and overall confirms classical geopolitics expectations, where vulnerable and resourceful states (“*land powers*”) behave offensively, while less vulnerable ones (“*sea powers*”) tend to behave defensively. The paper sets a counterpoint to the prevailing “cyber exceptionalism” and contributes to ongoing debates about the offense-advantage in cyberspace, as well as the equalizing effect of cyber conflict on power politics in conventional realms.