Abstract
The EU’s interest to play a role in Indo-Pacific security is rooted in the realization that European prosperity is inherently connected to and dependent on a stable and peaceful regional environment. Brussels has been advocating a more proactive engagement in the region already in its 2016 Global Strategy. The EU “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, published in 2021, explicitly highlights security and defense as one of the key priority areas for cooperation. While the rationale stands, the exact contours and content of this engagement remain often unclear and misunderstood. Indeed, as a trading power with no army nor military leverage, the EU’s capacity to effectively contribute to the region’s traditional security hotspots is limited. However, such view fails to consider the evolving nature of security, which has become increasingly defined by hybrid tactics and all-encompassing weaponization. At the same time, it omits the importance of everyday functional security concerns that have been sidelined in the context of great power politics. This paper argues that the EU can play a constructive role in the Indo-Pacific at several levels. First, it can leverage its economic, technological, and normative heft in areas such as economic security, emerging and disruptive technologies, and governance of global commons, including the maritime, the outer, and the information space. Secondly, its expertise in addressing non-traditional security challenges such illegal fishing, transnational crime, or environmental degradation, is of great value to many developing countries in the region. Finally, its effort to forge a third way in the escalating Sino-American rivalry echoes the sentiments of many regional partners, building its image as a trustworthy, stabilizing force.
Panel: Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from the EU