Abstract
Can passions be used strategically to justify wars? To justify their violent endeavors, actors design strategic communications aiming at convincing others – their community, the international community, international jurisdictions – of the validity of their violent project. From Menelas who “had to” get his revenge against Pâris, to contemporary jihadists of the likes of the Kouachi brothers who mention that they fight to “avenge the Prophet”, desires for revenge seemingly constitute one of such strategies. In fact, Richard Ned Lebow sees in revenge one of the four main justifications of wars from the 19th to the 21st centuries. Centuries before them, Just War thinker Gratian had declared, quoting Cicero's De Republica, that “those wars are unjust which are undertaken without cause. For aside from vengeance or for the sake of fighting off enemies, no just war can be waged” (Rep. III. 35a). Vengeful passions are thus strategically mobilized, at the discursive level, to posit the morality of a war cause, i.e., to justify taking up arms. Other passionate outbursts also seemingly play a role in justifying political violence. In international law, preventive and preemptive self-defenders seem justified to act because they “fear” that something may happen. Similarly, States may be justified in acquiring nuclear capacities because they “fear” that others, non-liberal actors, may own them too. Realist accounts of war, additionally, justify the accumulation of capabilities around the fear that others may be preparing for attack. In the history of conflicts, therefore, actors who feel vengeful and/or afraid may arguably be justified in going to war. How is that so? What is the status of passions as justifications for war? Can they ever be used strategically to justify violent endeavors and what are the ethical underpinnings behind such use?