Abstract
This paper examines varying inclusion of non-state actors in UN cybercrime governance. While the criminal use of cyberspace is a prime example for a non-traditional security threat with political, economic as well as societal consequences, there is limited research on how traditional multilateral organizations react to the growing importance of non-state actors in this field. Recent developments in some UN forums have called for more inclusion of non-state actors as important, although contested, parts of cybersecurity governance. While the transboundary and rapidly evolving nature of cybercrimes necessitates collaboration to share resources and responsibility, recent debates in different UN cybersecurity fora reflect states' reluctance toward multistakeholder involvement due to long-term geopolitical divisions. Going beyond these debates, this paper aims to better understand current variance of non-state actors' inclusion in UN cybersecurity fora. The paper is structured as follows: we first introduce the role of non-state actors in crime governance more broadly. We then put forward arguments for variance in the inclusion of non-state actors to UN cybersecurity institutions, relying on arguments linked to institutionalism, resource-exchange theory and those that emphasize the legitimacy of decision-making. In a further step, we present current debates on cybercrime as subfield of cybersecurity governance in the UN and the role non-state actors play in these. We then compare non-state actor engagement across different UN bodies and fora and evaluate arguments for their inclusion. The paper is a first step in examining the diversity of non-state actor engagement, showing a large diversity in cooperation that deserves closer attention. It combines existing empirical research on cybercrime governance with new insights from an ongoing PhD project on the UN and cybersecurity.