Abstract
Negotiations are essential to ending armed conflict, yet we know surprisingly little about how violence evolves during the negotiation process itself. While existing research demonstrates that negotiations are essential for ending armed conflicts, most studies treat “negotiations” as a single event rather than a dynamic, multi-round process. This paper examines how armed groups behave across successive rounds of negotiations, asking when, why, and by whom violence is used or restrained during these periods. We argue that actors strategically calibrate violence to signal credibility, control, and commitment. Dominant or established groups often exercise restraint to demonstrate command and seriousness, while smaller, excluded, or newer factions use violence—especially against civilians—to assert capability, expand control, or spoil the process. Empirically, we combine new data on daily levels of violence with information on the timing and structure of peace talks across dyads and negotiation rounds. The unit of analysis is the conflict-day, allowing us to trace shifts in violence both within and across rounds of talks. This paper offers a first step toward understanding how violence operates during the negotiation process, setting the stage for broader questions about why some peace efforts collapse early, why others endure through multiple rounds, and how the sequencing and structure of talks influence the trajectory of violence on the ground.
Panel: Beyond the State: Securitization, Governance, and Private Actors