Abstract
While the role of armaments, and in particular forward-deployed military forces, as signals of reassurance is well-established in the scholarly literature, existing research has not explored when and why armaments may worry allies. In this paper, I consider disagreements between allies about the right armaments by the patron for the defense of a client as symptoms of defense misalignment, reflecting deeper disagreements about the preferred way of warfare among allies. The article proposes a novel theory of armaments as signals of defense misalignment to explain how certain types of armaments can prove contentious between allies. In essence, armaments can trigger conflicts between allies by transforming abstract defense strategies, drafted by political logic, into tangible, material capabilities. As armaments resolve the contradictions and pin down the ambiguities, deliberately included in the strategy for political reasons, they bring the underlying conflicts, stemming from allies’ divergent security interests, back to the fore. I offer a typology of characteristics that render armaments particularly prone to reveal instances of defense misalignment, and I test my theory through case studies on intra-NATO disputes about the role of nuclear forces for the alliance’s defense during the Cold War. My findings are particularly relevant to the context of European defense today. A better understanding of the role of armaments in revealing instances of defense misalignment is essential for safeguarding political cohesion between European NATO allies.
Panel: Stepping into the Future: Military Technology, Innovation Practices, and Contemporary Challenges