Abstract
Previous research on whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NPR) works has focused on whether it deters states from seeking nuclear weapons, with mixed results. We investigate an alternative mechanism: by suppressing the global market for nuclear technology, the NPR forces would-be proliferants to build sensitive nuclear facilities on their own and in secret. This should affect both what kind of facilities a state tries to build and how long it takes to complete them, because each state must essentially re-invent the technology for itself. We analyze a newly completed dataset of nuclear facilities and compare it to data on conventional power plants, which are not subject to any nonproliferation regime. We find that the NPR has dramatically increased the time required to build nuclear facilities, relative to what would have occurred in its absence. In aggregate, the regime has prevented thousands of nuclear-state-years, arguably proving that it is enormously effective.
Panel: Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and Arms Control