Abstract
Development and humanitarian relief organizations often follow contrasting operational logics: while humanitarian assistance is short-term, neutral, and prioritizes access to populations in need, development aid is long-term, partisan for the state, and dependent on state capacity to succeed. In cases of protracted armed conflict, this division becomes problematic, as only through development aid can humanitarian emergencies be overcome and prevented. Increasingly, humanitarian and development organizations work jointly within UN peacebuilding in a “triple nexus” aimed at long-term peace and security. This paper examines the relevance of the triple nexus construct for organized criminal violence in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. While not formally armed conflicts, the intensity and humanitarian toll of transnational criminal violence in the region is comparable to armed conflicts. And yet, prominent development aid organizations have followed the peacetime logic, instead of working jointly with humanitarian actors or UN agencies. The paper looks specifically at World Bank practice, contrasting its protocols for “Fragile and Conflict-Affected States” with its strategies of adjustment and response to organized criminal violence in the region.