Abstract
How secure are secure second-strike nuclear forces? For many, secure second-strike capability has been embodied by nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), whether deployed in open-ocean patrol patterns or in naval bastions. The historical record, however, highlights significant variation in the relative survivability of deterrent forces due to technological advancements in weapon accuracy and intelligence. This paper evaluates vulnerability with respect to SSBNs. Specifically, it focuses on the vulnerability of Russian sea-based nuclear deterrent forces in the Barents Sea to U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms engaged in an effort to trail SSBNs. Examining undersea competition in the Arctic using the campaign analysis method, this paper asks two questions. First, how vulnerable are Russian SSBNs? And second, how effectively can U.S. attack submarines (SSNs) detect and trail SSBNs in the Barents Sea? After considering the oceanographic characteristics of the campaign’s environment and the availability and capability of U.S. and Russian forces operating in the Arctic, this study argues that U.S. SSNs would likely struggle to effectively and covertly trail Russian SSBNs in the Barents Sea. Importantly, U.S. challenges do not equate to Russian advantages in ASW against the United States. Instead, in an environment characterized by shallow water and ever-quieter submarines, both sides risk playing “blind man’s bluff” in the Barents.