Abstract
Huntingtonian norms that advocate for a sharp divide between military strategy-making and its execution are increasingly being challenged today. While much of the analysis has focused on the implications for civilian control and democratic health, less attention has been paid to their implications for battlefield effectiveness. Those that do address effectiveness in war overwhelmingly cite the emergence of 'gray zone warfare' and modern war as the forces behind the need to re-evaluate the civil-military relationship. This article uses an historical lens to argue that the Huntingtonian norms have, in fact, never been effective at ensuring battlefield success for three reasons. First, military strategies must be tied to political objectives, even and especially as they change over time. Second, the ends-ways-means strategy-making process requires integrating both decisions about resources – a fundamentally political decision – and military objectives. Third, in democracies, military leaders must be aware of the constraints that public opinion places on elected leaders and ensure that military strategies can sustain public support for victory. Using evidence from the invasion of North Africa during World War II (also known as Operation Torch), the paper shows that even in the most conventional conflicts, the most effective military commanders are those who take the political constraints and strategy-making process seriously.
Panel: Military Professionalism in Crisis: The Present and Future of Democratic Civil-Military Relations