Papers on theoretical developments in security studies presented at EISS conferences and workshops, newest first. 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z https://eiss-europa.com/feeds/themes/theoretical-developments-in-security-studies.xml European Initiative for Security Studies https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-anticipated-failure-why-states-go-to-war-un-der-prepared 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Mariya Grinberg

Why do states engage in wars for which they are un(der)prepared? Specifically, why do states enter wars when they have good reason to expect that they will not be able to achieve their strategic objectives with their chosen war plans? To understand why states would go to war with flawed plans, we need to know two things: (1) what options to modify the flawed initial war plan were available, and (2) how states pick among their available options. I argue that civilian-military buck-passing restricts the options states have to modify their war plans. Furthermore, the limits on a state’s latent power and the extent of its actualized military power affects how the state selects among their restricted options. These arguments are illustrated through an examination of German war planning in World War II. Germany revised their war plans to fix expected flaws for Fall Gelb, but went to war with a plan known to be flawed in Operation Barbarossa.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-financial-in-security-tiktok-and-the-far-right-pipeline 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Clara Jammot

While the relationship between far-right extremism, libertarianism, and neoliberalism has long been established, algorithmic recommendation as well as the lucrative professionalisation of content creation are leading platforms like TikTok to impact how financial (in)security feeds into the far-right’s proliferation. The rise in influencers promoting an individualistic ‘entrepreneurial mindset’ alongside aspirational lifestyles that are rooted in politicized identities has encouraged the consumption of narratives and routines that promote far-right values. Drawing on ontological security theory and discourse analysis, this paper asks: how do the ontological (in)security narratives of finance-related content relate to far-right ideology? Amongst the 3,246 TikTok posts and 19,805 comments analysed for this paper, three main ontological security narratives relate to far-right extremism. The first, and most dominant, interprets the red-pilled concept of ‘breaking out of the matrix’ as the act of achieving freedom from a perceived oppressive financial system by accumulating wealth and material resources. In addition to promoting a neoliberal individualist imperative that aligns with the far-right, this narrative frequently displayed senses of shame due to financial instability. The second narrative draws on far-right conservativism to blend financial aspiration with gender, framing success and financial security as dependent on traditional gender roles (e.g., tradwives) and on extremist masculinist views about romantic partners (e.g., choosing between supportive wives and ‘gold-diggers’). The final narrative focuses on the ‘influencer saviour’ which points to the connection between finance, religion and the far-right – specifically in how users address their own ontological insecurity by relying on, and idolizing, influencers who appear to have achieved financial stability. At a time of financial insecurity, developing this facet of the online far-right is crucial to not only better understand the radicalization processes threatening democracy but also to identify the topics that policymakers can address to counter the rise of far-right extremism.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-fortifying-the-eastern-flank-leveraging-historical-lessons-to-create-effective-d 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Alexander Lanoszka Dr Michael Hunzeker

In early 2024, Poland and the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced plans to put up fortifications along their eastern frontier. Yet one lesson that analysts might draw from contemporary experience is that defensive systems of the sort planned for parts of NATO’s so-called Eastern Flank have little to no utility except for sapping precious resources that could be spent elsewhere. We argue that this skepticism towards fortifications is misguided even though defence establishments must be attuned to the risk of catastrophic failure. A conventional defensive system must have depth and enable the ability to go about counteroffensives. A major reason for the historical failures associated with fortifications is because defenders either did not match the imagination of their adversaries or neglected the value of depth and counterstrike options. For those considering how to fortify the Eastern Flank, they must pair static defences with operational as well as organizational dynamism. We offer a framework for how to think about effective defence systems and use various case studies, two of which are drawn from the First World War, to substantiate our argument. We conclude by teasing the implications of our analysis for how Poland and the three Baltic countries can create effective defence systems.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-from-national-incident-response-to-zero-trust-bridging-cyber-defence-policy-and 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Dmytro Uzlov Vladyslav Vilihura

The ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine has become an unprecedented stress test for national cybersecurity systems, exposing both the capabilities and the limitations of existing cyber-defence architectures under sustained adversary pressure. This paper examines two interrelated dimensions of cybersecurity governance that have acquired acute relevance for European security: national-level prioritization of cyber incidents, and the adoption of zero trust architecture (ZTA) as a paradigm shift in organizational security. First, the paper presents a multi-factor methodology for prioritizing cyber incidents, intended for use by national CERTs such as CERT-UA. The methodology integrates the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) with Ukraine's national criticality levels through a hierarchical structure that provides structured tie-breaking via multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). The paper proposes a simulation-based evaluation framework for assessing the methodology's effectiveness in handling high-volume incident streams while preserving a decisive and transparent allocation of resources—a critically important capability for states operating under persistent cyber threat. Second, the paper analyses the concept of zero trust as a promising security paradigm for European critical infrastructure. Based on a systematic review of international ZTA models and practical enterprise-deployment experience, it identifies the principal barriers to adoption – in particular awareness gaps, shortages of skilled personnel, and organizational complexity – and proposes practical recommendations for policymakers and security practitioners. By bridging operational-level incident response with strategic architectural transformation, this paper contributes to an interdisciplinary dialogue at the intersection of cybersecurity engineering, security governance, and defence policy. It offers empirically grounded conclusions relevant to European states seeking to strengthen their cyber resilience amid a shifting threat landscape shaped by statesponsored cyber operations, digital-infrastructure dependencies, and the imperative of collective cyber defence within NATO and EU structures.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-influence-as-strategic-infrastructure-china-nato-and-competition-below-the-thres 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Sara Russo Mrs Giulia Biselli

Strategic competition is increasingly unfolding below the threshold of armed conflict, where influence over perception, legitimacy, and coordination might determine the outcomes without the use of force. While widely acknowledged, influence is still treated as an auxiliary component of military and political strategy, framed through information operations or psychological warfare. Furthermore, recent debates appear to have been affected by conceptual inflation, whereby the heavy use of ‘war’ terminology has obscured influence as a distinct strategic arena. This paper aims to fill this gap through a case study that analyses how China and NATO conceptualise influence as a strategic practice that affects cognition, understood not as individual psychology but as a collective environment in which decisions are made. China and NATO’s strategies are compared as contrasting approaches to the use of influence to exercise power: China's Three Warfares strategy treats cognition as an object of long-term conditioning to limit adversaries’ coordination and advance China’s objectives without open conflict; conversely, NATO approaches cognitive warfare from a defence perspective, emphasizing counter-parts analysis, resilience and ethical considerations. This comparison reveals that the distinctions between China and NATO are not based on technology or capabilities, but rather on their strategic thinking, which appear to be characterized by a conceptual asymmetry. Because cognition underpins collective sensemaking, interaction between organizations employing different strategic logics may generate misalignment. The latter can result in mismatched comprehension leading to delayed responses, coordination difficulties, and, in situations of persistent competition, an increased risk of escalation. This paper aims to demonstrate that overlooking cognition as a core strategic variable risks missing how advantage is created in alliance-based security systems long before any force is used, which may produce far-reaching consequences for grand strategy, military planning, and international cooperation.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-knowing-cybersecurity-the-epistemic-infrastructural-power-of-big-tech 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Tobias Liebetrau

Big tech companies authoritatively produce data, information, and knowledge about cybersecurity threats to individuals, businesses, and states. But how do they render international cybersecurity phenomena knowable? Through which practices, means, and devices is this knowledge generated? This paper argues that examining the epistemic infrastructural power of big tech companies addresses these questions. Drawing on International Relations and Science and Technology Studies scholarship highlighting infrastructure’s role in knowledge production, the paper first conceptualizes epistemic infrastructural power. Second, it integrates this conceptualization with big tech companies’ unique position forming the infrastructural core of digitized societies, economies, and lives, alongside existing analysis of their security governance role. This develops a conceptual lens enabling exploration of diverse empirical manifestations of big tech epistemic infrastructural power, particularly regarding cybersecurity knowledge production and performativity. This matters politically because cybersecurity knowledge production is not a neutral or a-political endeavor, but a type of practice that co-constitutes entities and relations in the world by naming, categorizing, producing, and presenting specific realities or truths, serving as references for governance and policy decisions and practices. Third, the paper demonstrates this analytical framework's value by exploring Microsoft’s cybersecurity knowledge production during the Ukraine war. Extensive use of Microsoft products in Ukrainian public and private digital infrastructure enabled the company to collect, monitor, and analyze data about malicious network activities, positioning Microsoft as a significant gatekeeper and communicator of war-related cybersecurity knowledge. The paper concludes by reflecting on what governance object cybersecurity becomes through these dynamics and discussing wider implications for global security governance. The analysis reveals how big tech companies’ infrastructural position grants them distinctive epistemic authority in defining cybersecurity threats and shaping corresponding governance responses, raising critical questions about knowledge power in contemporary international security.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-no-woman-s-land-securitisation-of-female-forced-migration-in-afghanistan 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Jéssica da Costa Pereira

Forced migration is a phenomenon present in globalisation’s dynamics, as is the absence of women in the conceptualisation of the processes that shape the lives of citizens. At the intersection of these two realities, we aim to analyse female forced migration as a security issue, analysing the absence of gender in the definition of forced migrant by the United Nations. From a methodological standpoint, this research draws upon Feminist Security Studies, as it conceptualises the intrinsic relationship between gender and security. These key terms guide the semi-structured interviews with thirty Afghan forced migrant women, methodological instrument used to include the realities of women, in their own words. By conceptualising gender as a social and cultural construct, and acknowledging that it shapes the experiences of forced migrant women, we contextualised the background from which they depart: Afghanistan. More than four decades of war, compounded by the Taliban’s second takeover, have profoundly eroded women’s rights, prompting the forced migration of Afghan women. Three conclusions are drawn. Firstly, for the majority of the interviewed women, as forced migrants, security is linked to protection from gender-based violence, freedom from fear and human rights protection, and gender specific barriers remain overlooked in the migration journey. Secondly, the realities of women are not represented in the definition of forced migrant. The absence of gender leads to a gap in gender-disaggregated data on migrants flows and a lack of acknowledgment of the gendered challenges along the migration journey. Furthermore, it leads to the invisibility of policies that materially impact women’s lives and security. Thirdly, we acknowledge that in a spectrum of non-politicised, through politicised, and to securitised - existential threat, justifying emergency measures beyond normal political procedures - female forced migration is a security issue, as it is a matter of a particular saliency and political urgency.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-revisiting-multi-domain-operations-a-historical-reflection-on-the-respective-rol 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Dr Samuel Zilincik Dr James Horncastle

NATO’s new operational concept Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) assumes combining various military and non-military tools is essential and beneficial for winning future wars. In this article, we offer a historical perspective to enunciate the MDO’s underlying philosophy. Specifically, we argue that combining tools is not inherently necessary nor beneficial, and that prioritisation of one tool can prove contextually meaningful. To substantiate our claim, we describe how prioritisation prevailed over combination in different historical contexts and especially in the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-2025). Our argument does not imply that prioritization is always preferable, nor that it will prove decisive in future warfare. However, it suggests that NATO should treat prioritisation seriously, and avoid assuming that it will automatically prevail over its adversaries merely by virtue of combining tools. In addition to its practical implications, the argument also improves our theoretical understanding of grand strategy, strategy, and tactics, thus contributing to the current academic debates on these subjects.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-selling-the-future-of-war-discursive-power-and-military-innovation 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Nicolas Krieger

How do ideas about military technology become politically influential? This paper sets out to examines how competing visions of military technology emerge, gain dominance, and shape German defence planning. It focuses on public debates surrounding ‘classic’ (armour, artillery, etc.) and innovative military technologies (autonomous weapon systems, AI targeting, UAS/UGV, etc.), and analyses whether shifts in discursive prominence are reflected in formal defence planning and procurement decisions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s Zeitenwende. The paper advances an ideational political economy account of military innovation. It argues that under crisis and uncertainty, narratives structure how security problems are defined and which technological solutions appear urgent and legitimate. Private actors, like neo-defence start-ups, promote solutionist narratives presenting innovation as strategically necessary and economically efficient. Through discursive coalitions and epistemic authority claims, certain ideas structure agenda-setting and prioritization in defence planning and procurement while others remain marginal. Empirically, the paper combines large-scale text analysis through Discourse Network Analysis, document analysis, and elite interviews. The core dataset includes roughly three million German newspaper articles (2020-present), defence strategy documents, procurement decisions, capability programmes, and defence firm materials. I trace narrative evolution with Discourse Network Analysis, identify coalitions, and measure shifts in idea dominance (classic versus innovative military technologies), linking these temporally to defence decisions, to demonstrate how ideas become politically influential. This paper aims to answer how competing ideas about military technology shape agenda-setting and procurement in German defence policy and makes three contributions. Empirically, it provides the first systematic, longitudinal mapping of military innovation framing and prioritisation in German defence debates since 2020. Theoretically, it demonstrates how ideational power and solutionist narratives shape security sector prioritization. Methodologically, it shows how discourse network analysis can connect large-scale public debate to defence planning, with implications for understanding how commercially driven narratives influence national security policy.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/joint-2024-bioarchaeological-approaches-to-gendered-violence-in-prehistoric-europe 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Linda Fibiger

Presented at Joint Sciences Po–EISS Conference 2024. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-can-there-be-a-responsible-nuclear-weapon-state-understanding-the-agency-and-mor 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Tim Thies

This article reviews competing understandings of the agency and moral relevance of nuclear weapons for international politics among two incommensurable worldviews in global nuclear politics: hegemonic nuclearism and subaltern anti-nuclearism. It argues that what (if anything) is considered a responsible nuclear weapon state largely depends on implicit assumptions about the agency and moral relevance of nuclear weapons. Despite the enormous growth in research related to nuclear deterrence, the available evidence remains ambiguous and inconclusive allowing for competing interpretations about the efficacy and reliability of nuclear deterrence and the co-existence of various ”nuclear ontologies“ (Ritchie 2022). After introducing the concepts of action schemes and second-order responsibility, the article analyzes how the two ontologies understand the agency of nuclear weapons for international politics. Whereas hegemonic nuclearism places emphasis on the instrumental role of nuclear weapons for deterrence and stability, subaltern anti-nuclearism pays much greater attention to unintended ways in which nuclear weapons shape the sets of options available to human agents, including the inherent risk of inadvertent escalation, the opportunity costs of nuclear deterrence, and the extremely unequal distribution of security benefits from nuclear deterrence. From a subaltern anti-nuclearist perspective, the diminished human agency in nuclear deterrence provides little need to distinguish responsible from irresponsible nuclear weapon states based on their identity and intentions. Instead, subaltern anti-nuclearism deems nuclear possession itself problematic in the sense of second-order responsibility. The article contributes to a growing literature seeking to operationalize and engage with notions of responsibility in relation to nuclear weapons and explores the ontological foundations of competing discourses in global nuclear politics.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-changing-expertise-knowledge-production-through-artificial-intelligence-in-the-m 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Alies Jansen

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to help policy makers and military officers navigate the battlefield in Gaza and Ukraine has often made headlines in the past months. Rather than fully autonomous applications of AI, the technologies are reported to be used to quickly perceive, evaluate, and act upon battlefield information. Among scholars of security and strategic studies, the use of AI in the military domain has raised many questions on the ethical, legal, political, tactical and strategic implications of this development. Pivotal to this debate is the question if and to what extent decision-making can be outsourced to machines and which tasks require human expertise. However, what human expertise is and how this notion of expertise changed over time since the early uses of computer models for military purposes is not well studied. This paper therefore investigates how the relation between humans and machines in the production of expert knowledge has transformed. More specifically, it will adopt a historical approach to analyse how early computational programs, developed for a military purpose, balanced mechanically processed data with human judgment to create expert knowledge.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/joint-2024-chimpanzee-communication-in-conflict-and-cooperation-implications-for-the-evolut 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Katie Slocombe

Presented at Joint Sciences Po–EISS Conference 2024. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/joint-2024-clothing-and-deception-in-forager-warfare 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z William Buckner

Presented at Joint Sciences Po–EISS Conference 2024. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-envisioning-critical-strategic-studies 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Chiara Libiseller Isabelle Duyvesteyn

After the outbreak of a new war in Europe, the field of Strategic Studies is enjoying renewed attention and relevance. While this field, situated between history and political science, offers a wealth of knowledge on war, the field lacks ontological and epistemological diversity. Specifically, it lacks a critical tradition, akin to Critical Security Studies. The lack of such a tradition has meant that scholars pursuing constructivist or critical approaches tend to self-identify with (Critical) Security and thus are unable to make a mark on Strategic Studies. As a consequence, the ontological and epistemological foundations of the field have never been fundamentally questioned. The Western-centrism and state-centrism of the field have largely gone unchallenged, leaving the field ill-prepared to offer a deep and global understanding of war. In this paper, we develop a research agenda and an argument for the necessity of Critical Strategic Studies. We first offer an in-depth investigation of the state of Strategic Studies, analysing its research strands and traditions and assessing the extent of its ontological and epistemological diversity. Based on the limitations, gaps, and opportunities identified in this review as well as established critical traditions in Security Studies, Terrorism Studies and Intelligence Studies, the paper sketches a research agenda for Critical Strategic Studies. We argue that CSS is necessary to interrogate how the field produces knowledge, to provide alternatives to the hitherto hegemonic approaches, and to ensure that Strategic Studies is sufficiently diverse to allow for an in-depth understanding of war.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-exploring-how-the-emotion-of-interest-shapes-strategic-studies-scholarship-and-h 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Samuel Zilincik Dagmar Ludackova

Emotional influence on academic knowledge production is a pervasive but overlooked phenomenon. Like all academics, strategic studies scholars generate knowledge through thinking. Contemporary psychological and neuroscientific research indicates that all thinking is, for better or worse, influenced by emotions. Recent research from across different fields indicates that scholarly thinking is not an exception in this regard. Emotions as diverse as fear, anxiety, wonder, awe, and anger accompany scholars in their everyday investigations and shape how and what academics think about their subjects of inquiry. Building upon this previous research, this paper investigates how the emotion of interest matters to the development of strategic studies scholarship. In our field, we usually treat interest in a rationalistic manner; almost as a manifestation of a cost/benefit calculation. The infamous trinity of “fear, honour, and interest”, unfairly ascribed to Thucydides, is perhaps the most popular example of this tendency. However, there are other ways to think about interest. Specifically, contemporary psychological literature shows that interest can also be understood as an emotion. This literature allows us to understand how interest emerges, how it influences our thinking, how it motivates behavior, and how it can be regulated. Accordingly, this paper combines this emotional perspective with abductive logic and selected examples of contemporary strategic studies scholarship to illustrate how interest shapes knowledge production in our field. The paper further discusses some notable implications of interest’s influence on strategic studies scholarship. In particular, it highlights certain positive and negative aspects of interest’s influence and elaborates on the possibility of regulating interest for the purpose of improving the quality of thinking in strategic studies.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/joint-2024-foreign-policy-before-the-state-diplomatic-practices-in-prehistory 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Hugo Meijer

Presented at Joint Sciences Po–EISS Conference 2024. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/joint-2024-the-peace-violence-paradox-in-the-human-species-implications-for-international-r 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Richard Wrangham

Presented at Joint Sciences Po–EISS Conference 2024. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/joint-2024-unwritten-testimony-from-the-past-uncovering-evidence-of-prehistoric-violence-an 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Christopher Knüsel

Presented at Joint Sciences Po–EISS Conference 2024. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-virtually-inconceivable-foregrounding-the-ontological-dimension-to-cyber-strateg 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Julia Carver

How can an ontological framework help us to better understand strategic behaviour in cyberspace? Characterized by low entry barriers, fluid borders, and networked hierarchies, cyberspace presents opportunities for us to problematize classical assumptions about power projection and their implications for how we conceive of strategic behaviour in the digital age. However, present literature has largely overlooked the ontological dimension to cyberspace, focusing instead upon the production and consequences of cyber effects. This oversight is particularly stark in debates about how global actors have engaged in ‘cyber-geopolitics’, which seem to rely on–and simultaneously eschew–territorial sovereignty to explain strategic behaviour. This paper argues that the field’s failure to take ontology seriously has resulted in inadequate assumptions and explanations about contemporary strategic behaviour. To advance this claim, I make two analytical moves. First, I interrogate scholarly assumptions about what makes certain cyber capabilities ‘matter’ for producing effects in the first place. Building on these findings, I then demonstrate the utility of ontological security theory for explaining how and why policymakers have pursued geopolitical objectives in cyberspace through particular discourses and practices. The European Union’s cyber-foreign policy development from 2013-2022, which has thus far escaped pure realist and materialist-oriented expectations, is leveraged as an illustrative case. Overall, the paper reveals the co-constitutive relationship between cyberspace as an environment and foreign policy actors’ self-construction within it through discourses and practices, contributing to an emerging research agenda on this subject (e.g. Lupovici, 2022).

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-overcoming-obstacles-reflections-on-creating-a-cross-national-experimental-cyber 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Ayhan Gucuyener

Because of the pervasiveness of digital technologies, academic interest in cybersecurity studies from all disciplines has surged. Cyber threats have become a compelling problem for international security and the object of a growing interest in International Relations (IR). IR scholars have sought to catch up with the empirical evolutions of conflict in cyberspace; to unpuzzle motivations behind state interactions in this domain. However, rigorous scholarship, in particular theorisation and conceptualisation (Smeets 2022, Egloff 2022) remains at an early stage. Still today, the field needs progress in methodological tools (Stevens 2018). While the literature has been primarily focused on meta-theoretical work, one of the methodological advances in cybersecurity studies has been the application of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) methods that include scenario playing and simulating. As McDermott (2019) and Gomez (2021) pioneered the “cognitive turn” in cybersecurity studies, this approach allows looking beyond the black-box of the state, by shifting to an agent-oriented system. All the while, scenario-based experiments can provide cybersecurity scholars with a fertile ground to observe decision-making dynamics (Gomez and Whyte 2022). However these tools are not the panacea, and there are significant obstacles in developing an experimental design, primarily when research is conducted in a comparative approach. On this basis, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the methodological framework in an ongoing comparative study that looks at decision-making dynamics of cybersecurity professionals, using a scenario-based experimental design. The study will also discuss difficulties in developing cyber threat scenarios, in a domain that differs significantly from that of the kinetic domain. This paper will also address potential deadlocks in conducting cross-national cybersecurity research, such as difficulties in matching samples, the fragility of trust between agents, and other barriers to information sharing.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-empathetic-practices-in-international-security 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z Claire Yorke

Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-the-book-that-leaves-nothing-to-chance-how-the-strategy-of-conflict-and-its-lega 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z Dr. Benoit Pelopidas

Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-the-procurement-and-adoption-of-innovations-in-modern-naval-warfare 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z Aldo Carone

Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-tools-concepts-and-weapons-intellectual-history-and-strategic-studies 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z 2017-06-15T12:00:00Z Dr. Grey Anderson

Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.