Papers on intelligence presented at EISS conferences and workshops, newest first. 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z https://eiss-europa.com/feeds/themes/intelligence.xml European Initiative for Security Studies https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-do-parliaments-dream-of-cyber-power-parliamentary-scrutiny-in-the-strategic-doma 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Mattia Sguazzini

Cybersecurity has become central to strategic competition and foreign policy, yet research has focused primarily on executive decision-making, military doctrines, and national cyber strategies, marginalising parliamentary roles in this securitised and technically complex domain. This paper examines how legislatures scrutinise cyber policy in democratic systems. Using the framework of authority, ability, and attitude, the paper conceptualises parliamentary scrutiny as a form of strategic oversight shaped by legal prerogatives, institutional capacities, and political incentives. Building on the literature on parliamentary war powers and intelligence oversight, it shows how cyber policy blurs boundaries between defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure governance, thereby challenging established mechanisms of democratic accountability. The study relies on an original dataset of EU cybersecurity policies and a comparative analysis of five cases: the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and Spain. Combining text-as-data techniques, parliamentary metadata, and Institutional Grammar 2.0, it examines who speaks about cyber policy, how extensively, and with which institutional powers. The findings reveal substantial variation in parliamentary scrutiny, shaped by institutional arrangements, strategic ambiguity, and executive dominance. By situating cyber policy within debates on civil–military relations and foreign policy decision-making, the paper advances understanding of democratic oversight in emerging strategic domains.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-speak-through-the-nocturne-navigating-strategic-interest-in-intelligence-diploma 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Archishman Ray Goswami

This study determines strategic interest’s impact on the character of interstate intelligence diplomacy. Focused on clandestine diplomacy and intelligence liaison as specific variants, the study examines why the character of intelligence diplomacy deviates from anticipated trajectories when pursued as a tool of statecraft. It does so through three case studies: Israel’s clandestine diplomacies as part of its ‘Peripheral Alliance’ strategy (1957-1979), intra-EU intelligence sharing mechanisms (1991-2016), preferences surrounding and uses of informal/formal intelligence liaison mechanisms within the European Union (EU), and Anglo-Soviet liaison during the Second World War (1941-1945). Empirical insights subsequently drawn are used to explain such behaviour through theory-building pursued as part of a preliminary plausibility probe. It does so through hypothesis-testing conducted via foreign policy analysis (FPA), and by incorporating inputs from ‘intelligence power’ – the deployment of national intelligence architectures and capacities to exercise power – under an overarching cybernetic framework. The study seeks to serve a policy-relevant purpose by way of historical analysis, blending secondary research with consultation of primary data in the form of archival research/interviews. It draws attention to the expanded obligations of national intelligence services supplementing their traditional mandates, and of equipping them with greater urgency to meet these kinetically-oriented responsibilities in contemporary geopolitics.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-working-in-the-margins-can-small-state-special-operations-contribute-to-deterren 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Troels Burchall Henningsen

Many observers believe that Special Operations Forces (SOF) and special operations have been relegated to the margins by the return of deterrence and defence as the dominant military purpose for the militaries of European small states. SOF may find its niche within counter-hybrid warfare, as a flexible response unit to strategic shocks in the Global South, or provide the joint force with valuable, but not indispensable, intelligence based on special reconnaissance. While accepting that conventional and nuclear forces are the bedrock of deterrence and defence, this paper aims to explore how European small-state SOF units may contribute to deterrence posture and, ultimately, to conventional defence. Recognising that SOF should conduct only operations that create operational or strategic effects, the analysis departs from deterrence theory to develop a method for identifying how SOF may be utilised to create the most outsized deterrence effects. Based on empirical examples from the Russian force posture in the Baltic Sea, the analysis provides concrete examples of how special operations may threaten Russian vulnerabilities and create operational and strategic dilemmas, thereby increasing the cost of aggression and lowering the probability of Russian success. The paper argues that the value of European small state SOF will increase if the US pivot towards the Americas and the Indo-Pacific region results in US airpower, intelligence, and targeting capabilities declining in Europe. To compensate for the lopsided conventional balance, the ability to conduct special operations targeting key nodes in Russian A2/AD bubbles, to reduce the Russian navy's freedom of manoeuvre, and to organise stay-behind networks to target Russian targets in the deep becomes a much more valuable addition to the deterrence effect of the joint forces. Moreover, the paper argues that European SOF should develop its deterrence communication to blend overt and covert activities, creating doubt and imposing dilemmas on Russian decision-makers.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-getting-the-revolution-in-intelligence-affairs-right-technological-innovation-or 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Niccolò Petrelli

Many today believe that developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), sensors, and automation presage the coming of a ‘Revolution in Intelligence Affairs’ with far-reaching consequences on the performance of intelligence systems. RIA proponents advocate vast-scale acquisition of AI, state-of-the-art sensors, and automation technologies; support swift organizational and operational changes fostering integration between the various stages of the intelligence cycle; recommend development of operational concepts for human-machine teaming. In such a view, intelligence organizations embracing the RIA will be capable of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information at such scope, speed, and scale as to enable decision-makers to leverage ‘decision advantage’ on an almost continuous basis in the conduct of statecraft. How would such a transformation affect intelligence performance? We do not know, as scholars and experts advancing the RIA construct have assumed rather than demonstrated increases in effectiveness and scholarship has paid only scant attention to the impact of ‘technological revolutions’ on the functioning of intelligence systems. This paper argues that the RIA will yield results incrementally and unevenly, providing an answer in four steps. It first defines the RIA construct and identifies the causal mechanisms underpinning it by reviewing scholarship on the integration of advanced ICT into intelligence systems. Secondly, it develops a theory of intelligence power, by inductively deriving measures of effectiveness for the key intelligence functions from historical studies and grey literature. Third, it conducts an in-depth within case empirical analysis of the implementation of the RIA employing the Israeli intelligence between the late-1990s and 2014 as a case study. Fourth and last, it uses the intelligence power theory to test the actual performance of the RIA construct taking advantage of the extraordinary insights provided by the 2017 special report of the Israeli State Comptroller on the conduct of the 2014 war, which is based on official intelligence records.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-proliferation-not-democratization-open-source-intelligence-and-the-war-in-ukrain 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Damien Van Puyvelde

Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought unprecedented attention to open-source intelligence (OSINT) researchers who collect and analyse publicly available information on conflict zones and security threats. Some observers believe easy access to online information has “democratised” intelligence. The investigative group Bellingcat even claims to be an “intelligence agency for the people”. While the digital revolution has turned many smartphone-equipped individuals into sensors, it did not turn everyone into a professional intelligence collector and analyst. The ubiquity of digital tools enables small groups of skilled and well-resourced individuals to leverage open-source data and information (OSINF) and produce outputs that are comparable to finished government intelligence. Barriers to entry in the field of professional intelligence remain high. The rise of OSINT is not about democratization but proliferation of intelligence capabilities.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-apartheid-south-africa-s-intelligence-failures-angola-1975-and-beyond 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Kyle Harmse

In October of 1975, the South African Defence Force (SADF) launched Operation Savannah. The operation quite rapidly turned into an abject military failure, with the South African intelligence apparatuses shouldering a significant portion of the blame. (Warwick, 2012) Drawing on a vast number of south African archival sources, this paper examines the structural and doctrinal causes for South Africa's poor performance in Angola in 1975 and argues that, due to an almost pathological obsession with the internal security of the Apartheid system as a whole, the work of South African Military Intelligence (SAMI) was significantly hamstrung by the competing security requirements of the South African state. Formed from the outset as an organisation designed to quell internal risings by disaffected Africans, the SADF and its attendant Military Intelligence system had been forced to adapt to more conventional military intelligence work by the twin challenges of the Second World War and the emergent Cold War. However, by the 60s and 70s, disengagement from international organisations and the British Commonwealth brought about by Pretoria's intransigence on its policy of Apartheid prompted political-doctrinal shifts that again focused SAMI's attention inwards, towards matters of internal security (Frankel 1984). The so-called “securitisation” of the Vorster government during that time, did not, however, rationalise and reform intelligence systems—instead complicating their operations, muddying jurisdictions, diluting and duplicating efforts, and prompting outright political competition between four major South African organisations: SAMI, the national Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the South African Police's Special Branch (SB) and the Foreign Ministry's own intelligence system. Together, this awkward system persisted in an alliance with Salazar's Portugal (governing the territories of Mozambique and Angola) and Ian Smith's Rhodesia, undergirded by an assumption that an anti-revolutionary firewall of settler states could be sustained well into the 1980s. (Meneses, Rosa and Martins, 2017).

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-between-manipulation-and-failed-adaptation-the-italian-intelligence-and-the-rise 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Niccolò Petrelli

In 1968-69 Italy was swept by a wave of protests and riots by workers and students which were seen by right-wing politicians and extra-parliamentary organizations as the harbingers of a revolution. From that moment on the country experienced an appalling series of acts of subversion and terrorism by a multitude of right-wing groups that would last more than 10 years, including a sustained bombing campaign, several planned and attempted coups d'état, and almost continuous street killings. In the face of such an unprecedented wave of terror the Italian intelligence services performed very poorly; first they failed to provide strategic warning with regard to the shift of right-wing organizations from riots and aggressions to outright terrorism; secondly, they mostly failed also in the provision of tactical warning, proving unable to deliver timely and targeted information on the plots of right-wing extremists. Scholarly studies have generally explained such an intelligence failure by emphasizing the connivance between right-wing organizations and many high-ranking intelligence officials and the de facto adoption by the Italian intelligence service of what we might call a “manipulation strategy” geared towards taking advantage of right-wing terrorism to strengthen consensus around state institutions, in this way stabilizing the country (Bull, 2007, Willan, 2002, Ferraresi, 1996). This paper, by contrast, aims at providing a broader explanation for the Italian intelligence failure in countering right-wing terrorism by focusing on two hitherto overlooked variables, the “institutional culture” of the Italian intelligence, and its collection and analysis capabilities, and by integrating a vast range of archival sources declassified between 2014 and 2021 by the Italian security services. In the period under scrutiny, the institutional culture of the Defense Intelligence Service (SID – Servizio Informazioni Difesa), heavily biased towards political (and military) intelligence, significantly affected both collection and analysis. In fact, the SID managed to penetrate the majority of right-wing extremist organizations, and combining HUMINT and SIGINT disposed of non-negligible collection capabilities; these nonetheless proved inadequate for providing tactical warning of impending bombings, plots and attacks as the intelligence service penetrations tended to focus on gathering political rather than operational intelligence. Similarly, in terms of analysis, the SID showed an inclination to privilege understanding the overall political vision of right-wing organizations to the detriment of their social background, organizational features, and working mechanisms. Cumulatively, these had a deeply adverse impact on the intelligence service performance between 1969 and 1982.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-effects-of-open-source-satellite-imagery-on-nuclear-verification 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Alexander Bollfrass Stephen Herzog

High-resolution commercial satellite imagery has become increasingly available in recent years. This has enabled researchers to uncover headline-grabbing facts about states’ nuclear programs, those once reserved for the intelligence agencies of nation-states. Yet, scholars still lack a clear understanding of how open source satellite data may influence the dynamics of nuclear politics. We explore how the democratization of satellite outputs may reshape nuclear crisis management and verification of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Our paper identifies key gaps in the international relations literature and lays out five theoretical mechanisms underlying such developments. Overall, we find that commercial satellite data can both complement and supplement national technical means. Historical cases reveal that the comparatively less sensitive nature of open sources can position these data at the forefront of crisis bargaining and treaty compliance discussions. The net effect, however, need not promote nuclear cooperation. States must now grapple with the risks inherent in deepfake satellite imagery and the wider accessibility of military targeting information.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-intelligence-under-dictatorship-and-democracy 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Zakia Shiraz

In the twenty first century, there has been a broad doubling of intelligence expenditure across the world. This has taken place alongside various forms of cooperation including notable forms of South-South cooperation. However, the intelligence services of the global South that are at the forefront of contemporary security dilemmas associated with violent conflict, terrorism, and transnational organised crime remain at the periphery of scholarship. As early as 1988, the pioneering scholar Adda Bozeman wrote a path-breaking essay on the importance of the study of intelligence cultures in non-Western societies. In the same year, Argentine security practitioner and scholar, Eduardo E. Estévez, offered one of the first assessments of intelligence in democratic transitions in Latin America. In 1996, Mexico's leading expert of intelligence and national security, Sergio Aguayo Quezada, characterised the imbalance as 'not only absurd, but dangerous'. Latin America offers fertile ground for the pioneering study of intelligence under dictatorship and democracy. Processes of democratisation from the 1980s resulted in constitutional shifts, legislation to establish national truth commissions, centres of national memory, and judicial proceedings, which have naturally led to the gradual opening of some notable official across all major Latin American states–Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico–and several other countries. More recently, the press has emerged as an informal oversight mechanism that has led to spying scandals in almost every state in the region as well as the disbanding of the premier intelligence services of Argentina and Colombia. This paper examines the extent to which intelligence services and their activities are impacted by (un)democratic shifts in political governance. Using an Area Studies approach to the study of intelligence, it explores legacies of authoritarianism in Latin America's secret services and examines how processes of democratic transitions and democratic consolidation since the 1980s have impacted intelligence practices and oversight in region.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-on-the-institutional-battlefield-of-intelligence-oversight-the-case-of-questione 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Melanie Hartvigsen

Closed panel paper proposal: paper abstract This study brings together the literature of intelligence studies and institutional theory to illuminate the conflict between intelligence agencies and their overseeing accountants as rooted in conflicting institutional logics. Public expectations of democratization of intelligence agencies with respect to increased openness and transparency have resulted in more overseeing to ensure their accountability. And while intelligence studies have provided important insight into the resulting conflicts as intelligence agencies attempt to resist increased control, this literature builds on the notion of an institutional principal-agent relationship, hence assuming that the accountable and their accountants are parts of the same institutional body. Alternatively, we draw on insights from the literature on institutional logics that would approach the two agencies as constitutive of fundamentally distinct mandates in society and, resultingly, comprised of distinct sets of institutionalized norms, values, beliefs, and practices. In applying this framework to the analysis of a case of rare exposure of conflict between the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and the Danish Intelligence Oversight Board, we demonstrate that institutionalised oversight mechanisms and legislation alone are not sufficiently promoting democratic accountability. The institutional logics of intelligence services and their overseers have a significant impact on the actual practice of democratic accountability.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-complexity-of-the-grey-zone-the-experience-of-military-intelligence-on-nato 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Bram Spoor Sebastiaan Rietjens Erik De Waard

Conflicts are increasingly complex. As a result, much is being written on e.g. the changing character of war, the blurring between peace and war and the weaponization of means outside the conventional military domain. Often these developments are described as grey-zone or hybrid warfare and are examined at the level of war. Very little, however, is known on how military personnel on the ground experience this complexity in their daily work. This paper contributes to filling this gap. It focuses on the experiences of the Multinational Corps North-East in Poland and the Baltic States against the background of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Belarusian migrant crisis and NATO’s response to these and other challenges on its north-eastern flank. The research is based on extensive data collection, including more than 50 semi-structured interviews with NATO military intelligence personnel at various levels (corps, division, battlegroup) as well as numerous observations during the 4 field visits the authors made. The analysis is structured around the personnel’s perception of the operational environment, their comprehension of complexity and how NATO has organized intelligence for dealing with such complexity. The conclusion draws on the nexus of complexity science and organizational theory to reflect on the organizational validity of military intelligence with regard to complex problems.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-failure-before-1973-israel-s-intelligence-failure-in-1967 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Gil-li Vardi

The Israeli intelligence's failure to predict, identify, and warn against an impending Egyptian-Syrian attack in October 1973 has by now become a benchmark of intelligence failure followed by a strategic surprise. The failure became a well-studied history, almost too banal to discuss. Its sources, too, have been exhaustively examined. The Israeli “conception,” resting on the assumption that the Egyptians are required to take certain necessary steps before they attack, and that Israel has “special means” at its disposal to detect these steps and invariably alert it when an attack is immanent, led the heads of AMAN (Israeli military intelligence) to believe that they are safe in assuming the Egyptians do not plan to attack Israel in the Sinai in October 1973. (Gilboa, 2014; Bar-Joseph 2005) But what were the sources of AMAN's willingness to stick to its assessment, no matter the warning signals suggesting the opposite; to arrogantly silence diverging opinions effectively creating an environment in which they are preempted; and mostly, why would the Head of Intelligence cultivate a culture in which his opinion, and his alone, is the first and final word? The 1973 intelligence failure was predated by a 1967 intelligence failure: as late as the spring of 1967 AMAN failed to predict an immanent war, which would start shortly thereafter in June 1967. AMAN's 1967 oversight is not recognized in Israeli historical narratives or public discourse. It was never acknowledged as a failure or studied as one. In effect, it guaranteed that AMAN, and its leader, will fail spectacularly when tested again. Examining a wealth of archival sources from the IDF General Staff, this paper argues that between January and May 1967 AMAN failed to understand that war was an option for Egypt, that this option was indeed on the table, and worse, that Israeli actions—IDF actions—were pushing Nasser to opt for war. Beside failing spectacularly, in this way the AMAN leadership laid down the foundations for the emergence of serious organizational pathologies that would adversely impact the military intelligence performance in the years to come.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-intelligence-community-as-a-normative-actor-under-international-law 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Sophie Duroy

Although the exact parameters remain debated, it is now undisputed that international law applies to intelligence activities. A more difficult question, and a still unanswered one, is how international law and the intelligence community influence one another. In this paper, I demonstrate that the relationship between international law and the intelligence community is bidirectional and mutually constituting. International law first constitutes a strong permissive tool for the intelligence community. The intelligence community invokes international law to explain, justify, and legitimate its activities, while international law itself provides legitimation to many intelligence activities. At the same time, international law also constrains the intelligence community through the risk of accountability, which matches the increase in intelligence exposures. In turn, the intelligence community shapes the content of international law when it uses it for political legitimation. Whereas, in the past, the intelligence community remained silent on its practices, at best uttering ‘neither confirm nor deny’, the situation has changed. Forced exposure has triggered a matching need to legitimise intelligence activities through law. The intelligence community is now openly engaging with and interpreting international law, putting forward interpretations that will legitimise its preferred outcomes and empower it to pursue its choices of policies. In doing so, the intelligence community changes the meaning ascribed to international norms. In addition, when the intelligence community refuses to abide by the rules of the legalism game by providing a legal justification for its activities, it undermines the status of international legal norms, which may be perceived as less binding by the rest of the international community. For these reasons, the intelligence community has truly become a normative actor under international law and should be considered an occasional norm-shaper, if not yet a norm-setter.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-role-of-national-secondments-for-intelligence-support-to-eu-foreign-policyma 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Daniel Neumann

Existing scholarship on intelligence cooperation is largely informed by Anglo-American experiences at the strategic level. However, this paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of intelligence cooperation by examining member state intelligence support to foreign policymaking in the European Union. Increasingly, policymakers in the European Union take important foreign policy decisions for European nations. Although the European Union has various sense-making systems, these intelligence consumers require support from the national intelligence communities. Therefore, several member states are seconding intelligence officers to the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre to share expertise and to facilitate this cooperation. These experts with diverse backgrounds, identities, cultures, attitudes, and interests are tasked with working in conjunction to improve policymaking. Their home organisations have varying selection procedures and retain different relationships to them. Given this diversity, this intelligence cooperation does not occur without friction, impacting its performance. In studying diplomatic secondment and cooperation, especially on building a European ‘esprit de corps’, the European Studies have addressed similar issues at the organisational level. Leveraging this literature and drawing on elite interviews with European intelligence practitioners, this paper seeks to understand the impact of national seconding practices on intelligence support to foreign policymaking in the European Union.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-us-preponderance-in-nato-the-role-of-logistics-intelligence-training-cyber-and-c 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Alexandra Chinchilla Jordan Becker Stephen Brooks Hugo Meijer William Wohlforth

To meet the pacing challenge of a rising China, the United States seeks to devote increased resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific. Some have argued that the United States can free up resources by withdrawing most or all of its troops from Europe. After a US drawdown, the European members of NATO would make up for the loss of US manpower and equipment, though the United States would still provide C4ISR and a nuclear umbrella to its European allies. We argue that the US contribution to its NATO allies is much broader than manpower, equipment, C4ISR, and nuclear deterrence—and maintaining this larger contribution requires US boots on the ground in Europe. The United States provides important contributions to NATO allies in four main areas, which we term LITC: logistics, intelligence/information technology, training, and coordination. LITC includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence and offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show how US contributions in these areas cannot be easily replicated by the European members of NATO. Furthermore, substantially reducing US troop presence in Europe saves little money yet reduces its ability to provide LITC. Finally, we evaluate US alliances in the Indo-Pacific and offer recommendations for improving LITC provision to improve integrated deterrence in the region.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-breaking-the-one-the-evolution-of-the-national-intelligence-estimate-production 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Giordana Pulcini

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-intelligence-services-and-hybrid-warfare-the-case-of-ukraine 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Jan Mericka

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-power-projection-deterrence-strategies-and-escalation-dynamics-from-near-crisis 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Steven Lobell

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-rethinking-intelligence-services-learning-from-society-towards-a-project-of-shar 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Fernando Velasco

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-globalized-authoritarianism-intelligence-cooperation-and-transnational-repressio 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Fiona B. Adamson

Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-is-pessimism-well-founded-intelligence-analysis-and-the-intentions-of-competitor 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Andreas Lutsch

Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-libyan-covert-actions-in-europe-the-palestinian-armed-struggle-and-western-intel 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Aviva Guttmann

Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-of-ticking-bombs-intelligence-in-the-counter-terrorism-domain-1970-present 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Constant Hijzen

Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-cyber-action-russia-and-intelligence 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Jamel Metmati

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-hunting-terrorist-suspects-the-role-of-police-intelligence-in-fighting-terrorism 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Hager Ben Jaffel

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-intelligence-failure-and-the-2004-madrid-train-bombings 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Frennie Warner

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-keeping-secrets-surveying-the-factors-affecting-professional-discretion 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Damien Van Puyvelde

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-military-intelligence-and-top-secret-interrogation-centers-in-the-second-world-w 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Simona Tobia

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-short-presentation-on-the-iafie-s-research-activities-and-initiatives 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Bob de Graaf

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.