Papers on deterrence presented at EISS conferences and workshops, newest first. 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z https://eiss-europa.com/feeds/themes/deterrence.xml European Initiative for Security Studies https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-europe-is-not-a-country-nuclear-patronage-and-eurodeterrence-concerns-in-the-fro 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Christopher David LaRoche

Worried about the viability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence (USED), European leaders have begun considering arrangements of their own — most notably the 2025 Franco-British Northwood declaration. This paper assesses the institutional architecture required for a viable Eurodeterrent. It does so by asking: what are the institutional tradeoffs between credible assurance and strategic viability across different Eurodeterrence scenarios? Extended deterrence inherently involves tradeoffs between patron costs (investments in assurance mechanisms) and collaboration risks (coordination and defection problems among allies). My tentative argument is these cost/collaboration tradeoffs are exacerbated by two European realities: France and the UK are weaker potential deterrence patrons than the United States — making assurance costly — and European protégés have divergent strategic interests — complicating collaboration. While tradeoff specifics vary by Eurodeterrence scenario, their net effect may discount the proximity advantages of European nuclear patronage, undermining its viability. I answer my question in two parts. First, I use extended deterrence and organizational theory to conceptually identify potential tradeoffs across three Eurodeterrence scenarios. Given the perceptual nature of assurance, however, the results require empirical investigation. Second, I use the conceptual framework to guide semi-structured interviews with European policymakers in the frontline states — where the demand-side of deterrence is most acute. The interviews will investigate what Eurodeterrence scenarios protégé policymakers think are viable as a USED supplement or even substitution. Under what conditions might (e.g.) Warsaw trust Paris and London — and more than Washington? A second aim is to complement current patron-focused discussions by incorporating viewpoints from potential protégés with high stakes in Eurodeterrence collaboration.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-a-shadow-in-the-clouds-where-is-germany-s-missile-posture-heading 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Lucian Bumeder

The emergence of a “third nuclear age” has intensified scholarly attention on how non-nuclear strategic weapons affect nuclear postures under conditions of renewed great-power rivalry. As most research focuses on nuclear-armed states, there remains a gap in understanding how regional powers seek to obtain deterrence benefits through their conventional missile postures and how threat perceptions shape posture choices. This research seeks to address this gap in two steps. First, by comparing the missile postures of different regional powers and drawing on scholarship from nuclear posture analysis, the project develops a typology of three ideal-type conventional missile postures – retaliatory, warfighting, and strategic-escalatory. It then introduces an empirical examination of the emerging German posture by combining procurement data, parliamentary records, and official statements with semi-structured interviews with German policymakers and military officials. The interviews clarify how decision-makers think about likely threat scenarios, target categories, views on first use, survivability, the role of parity with Russian capabilities, and assessments of nuclear–conventional entanglement risks. On an academic level, this project contributes to debates on deterrence beyond the binary nuclear/non-nuclear divide. On a policy level, it provides insights into nuclear–conventional entanglement risks in Europe and implications for future arms control and stability efforts.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-conceptualizing-nuclear-umbrellas 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Alexander Sorg

Nuclear security guarantees are central to the global security order, yet the notion of the “nuclear umbrella” remains conceptually underspecified and inconsistently applied, often inferred from outcomes or equated with alliance membership. This paper (1) reviews the existing literature to identify where and how nuclear umbrellas are theorized to affect outcomes such as deterrence, nonproliferation, alliance cohesion, free-riding, and moral hazard; (2) derives a rigorous empirical definition based on three necessary criteria—a declared nuclear capability, an explicit commitment that includes nuclear use, and at least one ex ante costly signal enhancing credibility; (3) applies this framework to construct a global dataset of nuclear umbrella relationships since 1945; and (4) replicates two prominent empirical studies to provide theoretically grounded evidence of the effects of nuclear umbrellas on international security outcomes.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-cooperation-under-stress-organisational-compatibility-and-nato-eu-cooperation-in 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Mark Rhinard Dr Niklas Bremberg Anna Michalski August Danielson

Recent debates on transatlantic security cooperation widely assume that renewed political tensions -- most notably driven by the Trump II administration -- have undermined cooperation between NATO and the European Union. Such claims typically rest on assessments of strategic alignment at the political level. This paper argues that these assessments risk running ahead of what is currently known about cooperation as it is organised and practiced. Whether NATO–EU cooperation actually deteriorates under geopolitical strain depends not only on shifts in grand strategy, but also on the compatibility of the organisational and cultural interfaces through which cooperation is enacted. Drawing on inter-organisational relations, organisational theory, and international practice theory, the paper develops a framework that distinguishes three analytically separable but empirically interacting dimensions of cooperation: strategic alignment, structural compatibility, and cultural coherence. Rather than presuming either decline or resilience, the framework treats political disruption as a stress test that reshapes relationships among these dimensions. It generates observable expectations about how political contestation, procedural frictions, and breakdowns in trust and shared routines shape cooperation outcomes under geopolitical strain. The paper is primarily conceptual and framework-building. It uses the framework to take stock of NATO–EU cooperation across three areas central to societal security -- critical infrastructure protection, hybrid threats, and emergency preparedness -- laying the conceptual groundwork for a broader empirical research agenda on inter-organisational cooperation under conditions of geopolitical uncertainty.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-explaining-heterogeneity-in-public-support-for-collective-defense-in-nato-eviden 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Isabelle Haynes Dr Ondrej Rosendorf Michal Smetana

The deteriorating European security environment underscores the continuing relevance of NATO’s collective defence commitments. Since NATO is a military alliance comprising 32 electoral democracies, the commitment to defend any member relies on the domestic politics of its members. For these commitments to be credible, the alliance requires domestic political consensus and public support for defending allies that become targets of external aggression. However, NATO’s annual surveys reveal striking cross-national heterogeneity among allied states in public willingness to honour their collective defence commitments under Article 5. Despite the increased interest in examining the microfoundations of alliance politics, we still lack systematic explanations for why the publics in some member states are more hesitant to defend allies than in others. To address this important gap, we will analyse data from a unique multi-year survey conducted on nationally representative samples across all NATO countries. Using multilevel statistical modelling, our study will provide the first evidence on country- and individual-level factors that explain the large cross-national variation in public views on collective defence. Our findings will contribute to scholarly debates on the role of public opinion in military alliances and the pressing policy discussions about NATO’s cohesion and credibility.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-from-precision-to-existential-risk-hypersonic-weapons-and-the-erosion-of-the-con 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Mr Tahir Azad

Recent hypersonic weapon technology advances have changed military power, challenging conventional and nuclear warfare distinctions. Hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, promoted as precision, speed, and deterrence, are compressing decision-making timelines, circumventing missile-defence architectures, and blurring strategic stability-underpinning escalation thresholds. This paper examines how hypersonic weapons break the conventional–nuclear divide and introduce existential risk even without nuclear payloads. The paper has three main points. First, hypersonic weapons undermine warning and response systems, increasing pre-emptive action and launch-on-warning incentives. Second, their integration with advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and emerging AI-enabled command-and-control systems increases misperception, automation bias, and accidental escalation, especially in fragile deterrence regions. Third, prestige politics, defense-industrial competition, and perceived vulnerability drive hypersonic development, similar to nuclear arms racing. The paper uses the Ukraine war, the May 2025 India–Pakistan confrontation, and the Iran–Israel escalation to demonstrate how missile defence saturation, drone integration, and precision-strike doctrines are accelerating offensive dominance. Hypothesising hypersonic weapons as a “conventionally armed strategic force” with WMD-like effects contributes to military innovation and strategic studies. The paper sheds light on how emerging technologies are changing global security environments and complicating arms-control and risk-reduction efforts by placing hypersonic weapons at the intersection of conventional military innovation and existential security risk.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-legitimating-the-bomb-us-efforts-to-manage-public-information-about-nuclear-weap 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Jennifer Erickson

The horrific physical, medical, and environmental effects of nuclear weapons underpin long-standing ideas about nuclear deterrence, as well as challenges to their legitimacy and legality. Yet while US planners anticipated the bomb’s immense physical destruction in Japan 1945, they paid little attention to its probable medical and environmental effects. Instead, it was news reports about radiation in the aftermath of the bombings that first raised public concerns and criticisms about the bomb’s health effects. I show that this criticism prompted US officials to manage publicly-available information about the bomb in order to shape its early reception as a powerful – yet still acceptable – weapon. US efforts took advantage of the unique circumstances around Hiroshima and Nagasaki to emphasize the bomb’s physical destruction but downplay radiation effects to domestic and international audiences. In doing so, they also sought to avoid association with chemical weapons, which had been banned in response to public pressure after World War I. I argue that this information management was central to US efforts to build early public acceptance of nuclear weapons. The findings provide insight into contemporary political debates around nuclear weapons, as well as broader questions about the legitimization of new weapons in international politics.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-nuclear-futures-utopias-and-the-case-for-a-renewed-strict-sufficiency 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Benoît Pelopidas

The return of war to the European soil, coupled with the Trump administration behavior towards its Allies, has considerably altered the security landscape in Western Europe. Confronted with two superpowers in possession of the world's largest nuclear arsenals, a growing number of observers and political actors believe Europe must substantially reinforce its defence capabilities. In France, nuclear deterrence is regularly advanced to highlight Paris's strategic importance on the global stage and, in a context of heightened aggressiveness from Moscow, in addition to the potential reintroduction of military service announced at the end of November 2025, there has emerged a marked inclination to expand the national nuclear arsenal, so as not to fall behind in the arms race. In this article, I argue that there is nothing automatic or necessary in the need to increase the size of the nuclear arsenal or participate in the arms race. In this article, he identifies and rectifies three false, but commonly accepted notions which make such necessity of rearmament look obvious: (1) that these weapons provide protection, when ballistic missiles have made such protection impossible over six decades ago; (2) that the size of existing nuclear arsenals is necessary for deterrence, which is historically incorrect and ignores the emergent deterrent potential of conventional weaponry; and (3) that the possession of nuclear weapons is beneficial in all possible futures: on the contrary, it is irrelevant in some and harmful in others. Thus, the type and level of nuclear armament that is deemed desirable stems from subjective bets on the future, which need to be made explicit in the strategic debate. After clarifying these three points, Pelopidas invites France and Europe to take the multiple threats they face into account instead of focusing on one only and not to address each in isolation. I argue that this is particularly important given the carbon footprint of the arms race and its effects on the perceived desirability of nuclear weapons, which is largely neglected in existing scholarship. I therefore propose a redefinition of 'strict sufficiency' as a criterion for determining the appropriate dimensions of national defence infrastructures, beyond the singular focus on nuclear forces. This proposal could guide French and European public policy, as well as their diplomatic proposals to other nuclear-armed states, with the support of constituencies concerned about the effects of climate change.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-patterns-of-foreign-nuclear-deployment-understanding-host-state-refusal-in-nato 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Jacklyn Majnemer

Why do states refuse offers to host nuclear weapons on their soil? Much of the theoretical and conceptual focus on foreign nuclear deployment has been on the ‘patron’ or deploying state, or on the strategic incentives behind deployment patterns. While these are important explanatory factors, this paper argues that the role of the host state and its domestic politics need to be analyzed in greater depth to fully understand foreign nuclear deployment outcomes in NATO. This paper uses comparative case studies to develop a theory of host state refusal, examining cases of deployment and non-deployment of American nuclear weapons to NATO allies during the late 1950s and early 1960s. I argue that domestic factors within the host state are important for understanding cases of non-deployment. I highlight the role of anti-nuclear and nationalist sentiment as well as the role of elites in managing the domestic politicization of foreign nuclear deployment. First, I categorize NATO allies into cases of deployment and non-deployment. Next, I demonstrate that US interest in deployment is necessary, but not sufficient for determining nuclear deployment outcomes in NATO. Then, through process tracing and consulting available archives, I find that domestic factors contributed to host state refusal or to the prevention of a deployment offer in several cases, focusing on Iceland, Norway, and mainland Denmark. Finally, I consider the role of domestic politics in nuclear acceptance and why anti-nuclear sentiment did not prevent NATO nuclear sharing in Germany in the late 1950s. This paper utilizes archival material from the Norstad Papers, the US State Department Central Files, the Digital National Security Archive, and the Foreign Relations of the United States series.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-plus-ca-change-continuity-in-the-french-nuclear-approach 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z July Decarpentrie

French nuclear thinking reflects the aphorism “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” which translates as “The more things change, the more they stay the same.” Although France’s nuclear strategy has evolved, the way the French think about nuclear deterrence remains anchored in a certain tradition. This thesis aims to show how this is possible. The research questions are: How has traditional French nuclear thinking been sustained over time in the face of shifting strategic imperatives? What practices within the nuclear ecosystem reinforce this continuity, and how are they exercised? It is well established that the genesis of the French nuclear approach has its roots in the early years of the Cold War. Since then, the French have worked to protect this heritage. Overall, the state’s nuclear policy has remained largely unchanged, having “enjoyed remarkable continuity” (Jurgensen and Mongin 2018, 24). This does not mean that the French nuclear strategy remains unchanged since its inception. Instead, it suggests that the core of the French approach to nuclear deterrence has remained consistent with the strategic thinking developed during the Cold War. This study examines the continuity of French nuclear strategy, exploring how principles established during the early Cold War have been sustained despite international and domestic pressures. It focuses on three historical periods—1991–1995, 2001–2009, and 2014–2025—and analyzes nuclear practices as socially embedded, capturing how continuity is maintained. Using a history-of-ideas perspective, practice tracing, textual analysis, and interviews with nuclear elites, this research identifies three key mechanisms, policing, symbolic reinforcement, and the echo chamber, through which the French nuclear ecosystem maintains continuity. The French case is no exception: continuity is a choice and, like any strategic decision, involves trade-offs. Sometimes, trade-offs entail significant consequences. Yet continuity must prevail, requiring mechanisms to maintain and protect it even in the face of difficulties.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-reconceptualizing-nuclear-deterrence-and-national-identity-the-cases-of-finland 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Emma Rosengren

Finland and Sweden's decisions to join NATO after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine brought about fundamental shifts of their historical non-aligned security policy, and their approach to nuclear weapons, disarmament, and nuclear deterrence. Drawing on post-structuralist theory about the co-constitution of identity and security policy, this paper compares debates about nuclear weapons in both countries with the aim to reveal how identity-based argumentation was fundamental for long-term policy shifts. The analysis spans from the end of the Cold War, when both Finland and Sweden signed the Partnership for Peace Agreement with NATO, and joined the European Union, to the present. Comparing domestic debates about nuclear issues in both countries, the paper contributes new insights about how nuclear deterrence has been reconceptualized over time, and the role identity has played in relation to it.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-ritual-deterrence-magic-strategies-and-nuclear-war-in-europe 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Prof. Matthew Evangelista

Ritual deterrence is a compelling concept used to describe NATO's efforts, for example, to reassure its Baltic members and deter Russia through the deployment of troops known as enhanced Forward Presence (Mälksoo). Ultimately the deterrent threat relies on the alliance's willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to a Russian attack if other means fail. Describing how that threat produces restraint on the part of an adversary through arcane strategies of "counterforce" targeting, "graduated escalation," and "escalation dominance" has, since the Cold War, been the province of mainly civilian strategists engaging in what some have characterized as theology and others magic (Fraise). In the wake of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, think-tank and academic magicians have become more explicit in promoting integration of conventional and nuclear forces in the interest of extended deterrence. Meanwhile plans for deploying new nuclear weapons to support the strategy are underway. This paper analyzes official NATO and US declaratory policy, combined with specialist strategic literature, information about likely weapons deployments, and understandings of the environmental and human consequences of nuclear explosions in Europe to anticipate what the transition from "imaginary" wars (Kaldor) to a real nuclear war could entail. It focuses on the precarious security situation of Estonia and draws on historical analysis of a Cold War precedent in NATO plans to defend West Berlin—with particular attention to the mismatch between the assumptions underlying those plans and the likely response from the USSR (then) and Russia (now).

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-small-states-in-the-current-international-war-agenda-between-shelter-seeking-and 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Mitko Arnaudov

Current international relations are facing with the chapter characterized with so-called war public discourses, as well as decision-making processes which are erasing the international infrastructure based on the rule of law. In such context, so-called big powers have adapted to realist thougths about the functioning of the international system, while small, especially weak states are still de facto "shocked", without effective resources and protection in such circumstances. On that basis, the research question of the paper would be: What the small and weak states do have in "their hands" in performing effective foreign policy in current chapter of international relations? The research would be based on to confronation between classical realism and neoclassical realism, thus putting accent on the personal relations dimension between state representatives in the process of perfoming foreign policy versus the possibilities of rational cooperation between "big ones" and "small ones". In practical sense, the paper would serve in understanding the "mounevering space" that small and weak states have in the possibilities for strategic cooperation with big powers, thus securing sustainability on the shelter seeking basis. Western Balkans states will be used as an empirical examples due to different foreign policy approaches of the mentioned group of entities, as well as their characteristics which classifie them to the group of small and weak.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-the-confidence-trap-leader-advisor-deliberations-and-the-making-of-in-credible-t 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Wendy He

Conventional wisdom holds that states with superior capabilities, clear interests, and strong reputations issue more credible threats, while weaker states struggle to convince. Yet strong states sometimes fail to convince while weaker states occasionally succeed. Why? I argue that credibility is first formed within internal deliberations, shaped by how leaders interact with their advisors before a threat is ever issued. Drawing on findings from the Judge-Advisor System framework of advice utilisation from social psychology, I develop the Confidence Trap Theory to explain how confidence – the extent to which individuals are certain their judgments are correct – shapes the making of (in)credible threats. Leaders assimilate advice selectively: those who are certain dismiss dissent, reinforce preexisting assessments and issue threats that collapse when tested, while those who are uncertain seek multiple perspectives, second-guess their assessments and produce hesitant, ambiguous signals that adversaries ignore. Advisors differ in how forcefully they communicate advice: those who are certain advocate strongly for their position, while those who are uncertain hedge and dilute the clarity of threats. Using case studies of President Truman’s and Chairman Mao’s decision-making at the start of the Korean War, I test CTT against an allies-influence competing explanation, which conceptualises allied consultation as an external advisory input shaping leaders’ threat construction. On the U.S. side, the analysis examines advisory exchanges with the U.K. and India. On the Chinese side, it examines interactions with the Soviet Union and North Korea. Drawing on English- and Mandarin-language primary sources, I find strong support for CTT in the U.S. case and moderate support in the Chinese case. Truman’s overconfidence produced threats that failed to deter, while Mao’s handling of allied inputs enabled more calibrated threat construction that drew Washington into overcommitment. The findings suggest that understanding confidence dynamics can enhance credibility construction across diverse strategic contexts.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-upload-pending-tradeoffs-uncertainty-and-damage-limitation-in-a-multipolar-age 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Tyler Bowen

How does China’s nuclear modernization affect U.S. nuclear strategy? What are the crisis bargaining and crisis stability implications of the emerging nuclear balance between the United States and China? How might the nuclear balance evolve over time? This paper addresses these questions. I argue that by building more hardened targets, China is imposing a damage-limitation tradeoff on the United States. In addition, the deployment pattern of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, the growth of its air defense and counterspace capabilities, the adaptations of its mobile ICBM force, and the development of countermeasures against U.S. ballistic missile defenses are imposing damage-limitation uncertainty. Achieving meaningful damage-limitation is possible, but it depends on making optimistic assumptions about variables whose value will be difficult to know prior to a counterforce operation and that are likely to grow worse over the course of a conventional war. Plus, even if the United States achieves meaningful damage-limitation, it would leave itself vulnerable to Russia’s nuclear forces. This state of the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and China should reduce the crisis bargaining benefits of pursuing a meaningful damage-limitation capability while preserving the potentially escalatory dynamics of such a pursuit. It will also generate an intense cross-domain nuclear arms race in which it will be difficult for the United States to escape a condition of damage-limitation uncertainty despite technological advancements in weapons accuracy and remote sensing of mobile nuclear platforms. More broadly, this research indicates that a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD) will be difficult to sustain, but a condition of damage-limitation uncertainty is potentially durable.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-what-are-tactical-nuclear-weapons-for-the-multiple-logics-of-nato-s-theater-nucl 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Linde Desmaele

How and why has NATO relied on the option of a tactical nuclear strike as a means of achieving security? The debate over U.S. short- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe has been ongoing since their initial deployment in 1954. It has become more salient in recent years, however, due to Russia’s nuclear saber rattling in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. These developments have sparked increased discussions about whether NATO’s existing tactical nuclear posture remains relevant and effective. Proponents of maintaining and modernizing NATO’s reliance on tactical nuclear weapons argue that they are critical for credible deterrence and defense. In contrast, critics contend that these weapons are increasingly redundant and vulnerable, and have called for their removal. At the heart of these conflicting perspectives lies a fundamental difference in views about the value of maintaining a tactical nuclear strike option today. To explore these different views, this paper first identifies four key functions that NATO has historically assigned to its tactical nuclear weapons: substitution, linkage, conflict termination, and counterproliferation. It then examines how NATO has emphasized each of these functions at different times, with a specific focus on the interplay between political cohesion and military coherence within the alliance. The paper concludes that the variation in contemporary policy prescriptions can, at least to a large degree, be attributed to which of the four functions NATO members prioritize today. This fourfold typology helps explain the ongoing debate about whether these weapons should be modernized, maintained or removed from NATO’s arsenal.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-working-in-the-margins-can-small-state-special-operations-contribute-to-deterren 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Troels Burchall Henningsen

Many observers believe that Special Operations Forces (SOF) and special operations have been relegated to the margins by the return of deterrence and defence as the dominant military purpose for the militaries of European small states. SOF may find its niche within counter-hybrid warfare, as a flexible response unit to strategic shocks in the Global South, or provide the joint force with valuable, but not indispensable, intelligence based on special reconnaissance. While accepting that conventional and nuclear forces are the bedrock of deterrence and defence, this paper aims to explore how European small-state SOF units may contribute to deterrence posture and, ultimately, to conventional defence. Recognising that SOF should conduct only operations that create operational or strategic effects, the analysis departs from deterrence theory to develop a method for identifying how SOF may be utilised to create the most outsized deterrence effects. Based on empirical examples from the Russian force posture in the Baltic Sea, the analysis provides concrete examples of how special operations may threaten Russian vulnerabilities and create operational and strategic dilemmas, thereby increasing the cost of aggression and lowering the probability of Russian success. The paper argues that the value of European small state SOF will increase if the US pivot towards the Americas and the Indo-Pacific region results in US airpower, intelligence, and targeting capabilities declining in Europe. To compensate for the lopsided conventional balance, the ability to conduct special operations targeting key nodes in Russian A2/AD bubbles, to reduce the Russian navy's freedom of manoeuvre, and to organise stay-behind networks to target Russian targets in the deep becomes a much more valuable addition to the deterrence effect of the joint forces. Moreover, the paper argues that European SOF should develop its deterrence communication to blend overt and covert activities, creating doubt and imposing dilemmas on Russian decision-makers.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-can-european-defence-cooperation-build-european-deterrence 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Fotini Bellou

Is the European Union capable of developing a credible European deterrence? This question is more pressing than ever, particularly in light of the second Trump administration and its inclination toward unilateralism. As the war in Ukraine approaches its third year, the EU’s efforts in defence cooperation have intensified—but have they been effective in meeting the evolving security demands? The return of high-intensity, technologically advanced conventional warfare to the European continent has underscored the urgency of collective defence preparedness. Even before February 2022, EU member states had embarked on efforts to deepen interstate defence cooperation and, to some extent, defence integration. However, these initiatives have been cautiously readjusted to address the new strategic realities. Russia’s war against Ukraine has not only tested European security but has also brought direct threats to neighboring EU states. In response, EU member states have acknowledged—at least on paper—the necessity of multi-domain defence capabilities, culminating in a commitment in November 2023 to enhance their collective military readiness. Yet, has this shift translated into tangible progress toward European deterrence? Have EU states adequately responded to both the new defence imperatives and Ukraine’s calls for support? This paper assesses the EU’s progress by examining shifts in its strategic culture, actual responses to the war in Ukraine, and changes in defence priorities and military spending. It suggests that while EU member states have taken steps to enhance defence cooperation and provide moderate military assistance to Ukraine, these efforts have yet to translate into a more ambitious strategy with a meaningful deterrent impact. There's a need for a fundamental transformation in European defence thinking and capability-building—one that extends beyond the current trajectory. If deterrence is the ultimate goal, merely strengthening cooperation will not suffice; a more profound shift in strategic culture and operational readiness is essential.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-reanimating-grand-strategy-in-volatile-times 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Alexander Evans

Europe – and much of the traditional liberal democratic world – has not had to think much about war for the last 30 years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed this, while Sino-American competition and an America-first agenda only intensifies it. Where war was part of the collective policy framework or cultural imaginary it was wars of choice, not wars of necessity. International security, not national (or European) defence. The last 30 years was an intermission – a punctation mark of relative peace against a backdrop of the persistent and recurring war. This paper steps back to ask what implications this has for a particular form of European body politic: imaginative policy planning, training and grand strategic thinking. This tradition lived on in War Colleges but less so in academia or within government. European policy debates anchored on butter, not guns, and even now the immediate crisis is one of war and peace (in Ukraine), deterrence (of Russia), defence planning (for NATO and the EU) and fiscal realism (to fund rising defence budgets). Short-term crisis response overwhelms long-term imagination. Europe may have the Munich Security Conference and the EU Institute for Security Studies, but ‘strategic studies’ has a thin presence – including in the United Kingdom. What existing institutional framework exists for Grand Strategy, Policy Planning and ‘big picture’ strategic thinking about war, deterrence and hybrid conflict? To what extent is Europe equipped with the same intellectual inputs as exist from the U.S. Naval War College or statecraft programmes at the University of Texas? Where are the shared intellectual fora that bring together practitioners and thinkers in Europe? Where are the platforms for longer-term ideas to be set out, discussed and debated? This paper will assess current capability and explore options for renewal – including through new institutionalisation and networking.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-the-erosion-of-traditional-deterrence-space-as-a-case-study-in-military-transfor 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Raoul Cardellini Leipertz

This paper will examine the evolving interplay between legacy military technologies and emerging innovations, arguing that the transformation of the battlefield has reached a critical tipping point at which traditional doctrines are no longer adequate, and will do so by using space as a case study. As Cold War-era systems—constructed on static deterrence models—confront cutting-edge dual-use innovations such as autonomous satellite constellations, and cyber-enabled space operations, the security environment in space is undergoing a profound reconfiguration. Drawing on empirical analyses of state practises and legal frameworks from authoritative sources including the Woomera Manual, the MILAMOS Project, and the Tallinn Manual on Cyber Operations, this study provides a comprehensive assessment of how these new technologies disrupt conventional military effectiveness and strategic stability. The paper will first delineate the characteristics of legacy versus modern technologies, highlighting how historical systems have shaped deterrence through predictable and well-understood doctrines. In contrast, recent innovations introduce heightened unpredictability, diffuse the locus of control, and expand the pool of actors—encompassing non-state and commercial entities—thereby complicating attribution and response strategies. This analysis will expose critical vulnerabilities in current international legal regimes, which were originally devised for a markedly different technological era. The paper will propose a multi-pronged framework to bridge the gap between traditional and modern military capabilities, focusing on revising operational doctrines to incorporate real-time data analytics and adaptive response measures; and developing updated legal interpretations that reconcile existing treaty obligations with the realities of dual-use technologies.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-can-there-be-a-responsible-nuclear-weapon-state-understanding-the-agency-and-mor 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Tim Thies

This article reviews competing understandings of the agency and moral relevance of nuclear weapons for international politics among two incommensurable worldviews in global nuclear politics: hegemonic nuclearism and subaltern anti-nuclearism. It argues that what (if anything) is considered a responsible nuclear weapon state largely depends on implicit assumptions about the agency and moral relevance of nuclear weapons. Despite the enormous growth in research related to nuclear deterrence, the available evidence remains ambiguous and inconclusive allowing for competing interpretations about the efficacy and reliability of nuclear deterrence and the co-existence of various ”nuclear ontologies“ (Ritchie 2022). After introducing the concepts of action schemes and second-order responsibility, the article analyzes how the two ontologies understand the agency of nuclear weapons for international politics. Whereas hegemonic nuclearism places emphasis on the instrumental role of nuclear weapons for deterrence and stability, subaltern anti-nuclearism pays much greater attention to unintended ways in which nuclear weapons shape the sets of options available to human agents, including the inherent risk of inadvertent escalation, the opportunity costs of nuclear deterrence, and the extremely unequal distribution of security benefits from nuclear deterrence. From a subaltern anti-nuclearist perspective, the diminished human agency in nuclear deterrence provides little need to distinguish responsible from irresponsible nuclear weapon states based on their identity and intentions. Instead, subaltern anti-nuclearism deems nuclear possession itself problematic in the sense of second-order responsibility. The article contributes to a growing literature seeking to operationalize and engage with notions of responsibility in relation to nuclear weapons and explores the ontological foundations of competing discourses in global nuclear politics.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-public-support-for-arms-control-in-the-third-nuclear-age-new-evidence-from-nato 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Ondřej Rosendorf Michal Smetana Marek Vranka

During the Cold War, Western public opinion was an important factor in shaping the trajectory of nuclear arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, we know little about the extent of public support for arms control in today’s era of renewed great power competition. To address this gap, we conducted a series of surveys and survey experiments in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland. Our results show a high rate of approval of new arms control talks between the United States and its strategic competitors, Russia and China, among the citizens of all five NATO countries. Using data from a new elite survey of UK parliamentarians, we also found a sizeable gap between the views of the UK public and their political representatives. Finally, we demonstrate that public views can be strongly shaped by elite cues from experts and politicians, with arguments about the risk of non-compliance significantly reducing the support for new arms control negotiations. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on public attitudes toward nuclear weapons as well as to the policy debates on the feasibility and desirability of strategic arms control in the “third nuclear age.”

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-russian-nuclear-roulette-elites-and-public-debates-on-nuclear-weapons-in-moscow 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Lydia Wachs

How has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine influenced domestic debates on nuclear strategy in Russia? Western scholars and analysts have voiced the concern that as Russian conventional capabilities deteriorate due to the war, its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons could grow. Contrary to this expectation, this article argues that a close reading of political and military elites’ nuclear debates suggests more continuity than change in the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s security strategy. By analyzing the Kremlin's nuclear signaling, strategic deliberations among military elites, and public exchanges among policy analysts in the first 18 months of the war, it finds that there has been a significant increase in nuclear discourse at all these levels. Nevertheless, the select voices among policy analysts calling for a lowering of the nuclear threshold diverge from the signaling by the political leadership and the debates among military elites.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-small-islands-big-potential-a-taiwan-contingency-alliance-politics-and-the-defen 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Takuya Matsuda Elliot Ji

Debates over great power competition in the western Pacific have largely been shaped by the question over a Taiwan contingency. Nevertheless, the scholarly work on the topic has rarely focused on the strategic and operational roles that some of the Japanese administered islands in the vicinity of Taiwan. We argue that the group of Japanese islands that are adjacent to Taiwan–namely the Sakishima Islands–are strategically important assets since they are both enablers of deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and potential vulnerabilities that China could leverage for a wedge strategy. Taking the opposite side of the main island of Okinawa across the 155-mile-wide Miyako Strait, the Sakishima Islands are part of Japan’s southwest island chain that stretches towards Taiwan. Drawing from a series of Chinese, Japanese, and military-technical sources, we demonstrate that patrolling and fortifying these islands as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) outposts could strengthen deterrence against hostile Chinese action on two levels. First, fortifying this group of small and vulnerable islands is crucial in denying China the opportunity to engage in a salami tactic to test the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance through a fait accompli. Second, arming the group of small islands as A2/AD outposts could complicate Chinese operational planning for a blockade against Taiwan by directly threatening Chinese naval assets operating east of Taiwan. By doing so, the small islands not only closes a potential vulnerability of Chinese coercion but also plays a key role in checking Chinese maritime aggression. Our findings generate broad scholarly and policy implications in addressing strategic challenges in an age of great power competition, some of which are also of direct relevance to European security regarding deterrence in contested spaces, alliance politics, and escalation control.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-temporal-disparities-in-intergenerational-justice-a-comparative-analysis-of-nucl 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Franziska Stärk

Nuclear weapons and climate change put future generations in the wrong by externalizing potential long-term harm and constraining their freedom of choice through extended policy trajectories. Focused on nuclear weapons, this article conducts a comparative analysis of intergenerational justice concerns in both contexts. The principal argument emphasizes the distinct temporality of these challenges, revealing three crucial temporal disparities. First, the externalization of intergenerational harm follows different timelines. Climate-related risks intensify across successive generations, while the risk of future generations navigating the aftermath of nuclear war accumulates over the long term, becoming more likely over extended periods compared to shorter ones. Second, the sustainability of present generations' incentives to prioritize immediate benefits over future generations’ well-being varies. The appeal of fossil fuels is expected to wane over time in the climate context, whereas perceived benefits of nuclear deterrence are likely to endure. Third, while the visual salience of the intergenerational implications of nuclear weapons is diminishing, the gradual impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly evident. Comparing how intergenerational injustice unfolds through continued reliance on nuclear deterrence and climate change not only highlights the oversight of intergenerational justice in nuclear ethics debates, but also carves out the distinct nature of intergenerational justice concerns in the context of nuclear weapons. Derived from this comparative analysis, a more nuanced understanding of intergenerational injustice in nuclear weapons facilitates a critical examination of mitigation and rectification strategies.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-the-eternal-promise-of-missile-defense 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Sanne Verschuren

Why do states continue to invest in military technologies that are ineffective or simply do not work? Despite nearly 70 years of research and development in the United States, missile defense continues to face high, if not insurmountable, technological challenges, is financially burdensome, and has resulted in negative outcomes for strategic stability. Hence, this paper asks: What explains the continued and widespread support for missile defense among Americans policymakers? Contrary to common arguments about American cultural features, public appeal, and organizational politics, I contend that the persistence of missile defense can be explained by two conditions: technological malleability and a framework of ignorance. In a context of deep uncertainty and high complexity, technology is malleable, meaning that policymakers can envision it to serve many different purposes and thus have some benefit for everyone. At the same time, discussions about technology take place under a framework of ignorance, which enables policymakers to overlook, downplay, and deny the costs associated with missile defense. This creates the illusion that investment in the technology is relatively cost-free. Using original interview and archival evidence, I contrast two crucial cases: the entrenchment of national missile defense during the Obama Administration (2008-2016) with the decision to limit the development and deployment of missile defense under the ABM Treaty during the Nixon Administration (1969-1972). Not only does this paper introduce two novel concepts—technological malleability and ignorance—into the study of international relations, but it has also important implications for other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and cyber technology, that are bound to shape warfare in critical ways.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-the-inadmissibility-of-nuclear-threats-norm-or-empty-promise 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Maren Vieluf

In 1996, the International Court of Justice was unable to “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. This highly nuanced legal (non-)condemnation of nuclear threats came after decades of the Cold War, which was characterised by nuclear threats, but also decades of efforts to stigmatise nuclear weapons in general and nuclear threats in particular. The latter culminated, for example, in Article 1(d) of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which prohibits signatories from threatening to use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, over the past decade, we've seen a normalisation of escalatory nuclear rhetoric through the rise of populism and authoritarian emboldenment. A universal norm against nuclear threats has yet to manifest, and nuclear armed states have been the persistent objectors. In November 2002, however, the G20 Bali Declaration of November declared the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons “inadmissible”. What is striking about this declaration is that there was no disagreement on this language, even though the group includes six nuclear armed states, their allies and partner countries that base (part of) their security strategies on nuclear deterrence. The credible threat to use nuclear weapons is integral for nuclear deterrence as practised by nine nuclear armed states. It's also noteworthy that one member (Russia) has recently been heavily and widely criticised for its thinly veiled nuclear threats in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine. Does this indicate a strengthening norm against nuclear threats? And what implications does this have for deterrence and progress towards nuclear disarmament? This paper aims to examine the emergence and strength of the norm against nuclear threats through historical discourse analysis and process tracing.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-a-quiet-place-assessing-ssbn-vulnerability-in-the-arctic-ocean 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Nicholas Blanchette

How secure are secure second-strike nuclear forces? For many, secure second-strike capability has been embodied by nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), whether deployed in open-ocean patrol patterns or in naval bastions. The historical record, however, highlights significant variation in the relative survivability of deterrent forces due to technological advancements in weapon accuracy and intelligence. This paper evaluates vulnerability with respect to SSBNs. Specifically, it focuses on the vulnerability of Russian sea-based nuclear deterrent forces in the Barents Sea to U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms engaged in an effort to trail SSBNs. Examining undersea competition in the Arctic using the campaign analysis method, this paper asks two questions. First, how vulnerable are Russian SSBNs? And second, how effectively can U.S. attack submarines (SSNs) detect and trail SSBNs in the Barents Sea? After considering the oceanographic characteristics of the campaign’s environment and the availability and capability of U.S. and Russian forces operating in the Arctic, this study argues that U.S. SSNs would likely struggle to effectively and covertly trail Russian SSBNs in the Barents Sea. Importantly, U.S. challenges do not equate to Russian advantages in ASW against the United States. Instead, in an environment characterized by shallow water and ever-quieter submarines, both sides risk playing “blind man’s bluff” in the Barents.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-alliance-cohesion-and-military-manoeuvres-a-signal-of-deterrence-or-assurance 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Margit Bussmann

Military alliances routinely conduct military drills to practice interoperability, often unnoticed by the public. At times, however, military maneuvers are highly publicized events. This brings up the question whether these maneuvers are primarily intended for enhancing internal readiness and alliance cohesion or whether they are carried out to convey a sense of resolve to the outside world. Based on deterrence theory military exercises can be a mechanism to convey a credible threat and signal resolve to an adversary; and in case of extended deterrence a signal to allies that the protection will hold. Military exercises can also help in preparing prospective members to the alliance and create trust among former belligerents. With the help of quantitative analysis using data on joint military exercises we will assess whether regular military exercises among alliances partners contribute to more cohesion and more serious alliance commitments. We will also investigate whether military exercises with non-allied partners prepare for the accession of new members. Our results will shed light on the broader geo-political implications of this phenomenon.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-nato-s-nordic-neophytes-sweden-and-finland-s-accession-to-nato 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Samuel Seitz Julia Carver

Does the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO alter the strategic balance in the Baltic? The recent decision by Sweden and Finland to join the alliance has rendered most analyses on this question moot, as extant scholarship has focused on how the two countries could cooperate with NATO outside the alliance. To redress this gap, this paper assesses how Nordic NATO expansion shifts the military balance in northeast Europe using a mixed-methods approach with campaign models and elite interviews. Specifically, it employs logistics and combat models to evaluate Russia’s ability to deploy force against Finland. It further assesses the implications of the extension of the Russia-NATO border on force density levels and Baltic conflict scenarios. Finally, it models how control of the port of Stockholm and island of Gotland alters NATO maritime logistics capacity in the event of the closure of the Suwalki Gap. Our findings suggest the addition of Sweden and Finland meaningfully diminishes Russian force projection capabilities while simultaneously increasing NATO’s regional maritime control and logistical capacity. Interviews allow us to corroborate these findings against the strategic assessments of key NATO and European policymakers, to explore how NATO officials’ perceptions of strategic balance shape their engagement with and understanding of feasible operational concepts vis-à-vis the Baltic, and to probe the extent to which their strategic judgements mirror popular discourse around NATO expansion. Our findings contribute to the academic literature on territorial control and conflict, and they have important implications for ongoing policy debates by suggesting that NATO’s Nordic expansion is net positive for the alliance. It substantially enhances the regional power of the alliance and reduces the viability of a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-re-bordering-nato-the-strategic-dilemmas-of-yesterday-and-tomorrow 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Maria Sofia Macedo

Borderwork and its connection with strategic dilemmas have seldom been reflected in the academic literature on NATO. Territorial expansion of any international organisation is associated with constructing new borders, as the former internal and external differentiations need to be replaced. At the same time, new borders and related borderwork produce additional challenges in ensuring the new members are reined in, and the organisation is adapted to a new strategic environment. We argue this connection can be seen in the case of NATO expansion in the 1990s and early 2000s. A novel set of (re-)bordering practices was introduced, reflecting the longer border to be defended outwardly and inculcating the new differentiations on the inside. The installation of NATO-standard radios to supplement Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems on new members’ MiG-29 aircrafts, concerns over the Suwałki Gap, or accession’s democratic requirements illustrate this perspective. Such changes led not only to opportunities that NATO could pursue from its renewed geopolitical setting but also to a redefinition of challenges which required a more robust posture to deter adversaries and defend the expanded Alliance area. The presented paper thus identifies a connection between required bordering practices and the strategic dilemmas the Alliance had to face. In this regard, we use comparative analysis to examine the proposed relationship during and after NATO’s post-Cold War expansion and apply our findings to the potential integration of Finland and Sweden.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-us-preponderance-in-nato-the-role-of-logistics-intelligence-training-cyber-and-c 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Alexandra Chinchilla Jordan Becker Stephen Brooks Hugo Meijer William Wohlforth

To meet the pacing challenge of a rising China, the United States seeks to devote increased resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific. Some have argued that the United States can free up resources by withdrawing most or all of its troops from Europe. After a US drawdown, the European members of NATO would make up for the loss of US manpower and equipment, though the United States would still provide C4ISR and a nuclear umbrella to its European allies. We argue that the US contribution to its NATO allies is much broader than manpower, equipment, C4ISR, and nuclear deterrence—and maintaining this larger contribution requires US boots on the ground in Europe. The United States provides important contributions to NATO allies in four main areas, which we term LITC: logistics, intelligence/information technology, training, and coordination. LITC includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence and offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show how US contributions in these areas cannot be easily replicated by the European members of NATO. Furthermore, substantially reducing US troop presence in Europe saves little money yet reduces its ability to provide LITC. Finally, we evaluate US alliances in the Indo-Pacific and offer recommendations for improving LITC provision to improve integrated deterrence in the region.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-european-perceptions-of-nuclear-deterrence-in-the-era-of-trump-and-putin-and-the 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Tara Varma

Despite growing insecurity all around them, Europeans remain unwilling to renew their thinking around nuclear deterrence. In 2018, the European Council on Foreign Relations conducted a comprehensive survey of attitudes towards nuclear issues across the member states of the European Union. Two overarching themes emerged. Firstly, despite the growing insecurity all around them, Europeans remain unwilling to face up to the renewed relevance that nuclear deterrence ought to have in their strategic thinking. Secondly, and as a consequence, national attitudes remain much where they were when the subject dropped off the agenda at the end of the cold war – which is to say, scattered across the entire spectrum from those who continue to see nuclear deterrence as an essential underpinning of European security to enduring advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament. “Strategic autonomy” will continue to be an empty phrase unless Europeans engage seriously on the nuclear dimension. There are many ways in which Europe can move towards this goal, but without taking into account the nuclear dimension of their autonomy, Europeans will continue to believe that Russia will always hold the whip hand in any military confrontation with a Europe not backed by a credible US nuclear guarantee. The absence of a European deterrent, thus, may prove to be a fatal flaw. No immediate European initiative to declare strategic nuclear autonomy is practicable, desirable, or even conceivable – but a strategy to hedge against the uncertainties of the future is certainly available. President Macron is expected to give his keynote speech on nuclear deterrence in 2019 – as his predecessors have done before him. One will see whether cooperation with Germany or the UK will be put forward, but UK and France could convert the idea of a European deterrent from a mere notion into a credible offer, by thickening their bilateral nuclear cooperation and hinting ever more clearly at their readiness to protect others.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-france-european-defense-and-deterrence-since-the-end-of-the-cold-war 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Guillaume de Rougé

In the recent developments and prospects for a further rapprochement between European countries in the realm of nuclear deterrence, France has appeared as a key but veiled player, mirroring the perceived ambivalence of French defence policy in the conventional realm. Thus, this communication assesses France's European defence policy through the lens of the links and linkages between conventional and nuclear cooperations projects. It proposes a history of the debates related to the europeanization of the French « force de frappe », reconnecting the rational for such initiatives with pending conventional cooperations, in order to contribute to a better understanding of France's European defence policy as a whole. Two sets of questions are addressed, based on a chrono-thematic approach: 1/ To what extent did the idea of a French- or Franco-British-led Euro-deterrent played a role in European conventional defence cooperations in the aftermath of the Cold War, whether under NATO/ESDI or EU/CSDP auspices? Did the relative marginalization of nuclear threat and nuclear issues in the 1990s and early 2000s shaped a permissive environment for conventional cooperations, or did it represent a “glass ceiling” for NATO-EU member states keen to preserve the strategic transatlantic “coupling”? 2/ To what extent, despite its “virtuality”, the debate on a Euro-deterrent, reemerging since the 2014 Crimean crisis, has “unearthed” three key issues for France, namely the articulation between conventional defence and deterrence, the participation to the Alliance deterrence policy reform, and the strategic and operational constraints weighing on a potential European component (whether in the realm of information sharing, consultation, planning or execution)? To address these questions, this paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach combining post-Cold War historical materials based on French archives (until 1995), an oral campaign of semi-directed interviews with an updated historiography.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-german-view-on-a-european-deterrent-the-cold-war-and-prospects 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Julia Berghofer

Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-the-franco-german-security-dialogue-as-a-first-step-for-a-deeper-french-european 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Ilaria Parisi

In the 1970s and especially the 1980s, when European concerns over the NATO flexible response strategy increased, the Franco-German bilateral cooperation reached one of its highest point. Thanks to the personal engagement of personalities like Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, the routine of Franco-German contacts evolved into a very special relationship even in the controversial defence and security domain, at the expert as well as the political level. Nevertheless, these exchanges proved that one issue could hardly allow the two partners to find a common view: the nuclear question. With the Germans asking the French to precise where and when they would use their force the frappe, and the French hiding behind their national independence, it seemed that time for a cooperation in the nuclear field had not come yet. However, it is through the evolution of the Franco-German security dialogue that France began to lay the foundations of a future European security dialogue – that is yet to come. Through the lens of newly released archives, this presentation will show that at a time in which Europe hesitated to overtly question the American deterrence, France and Germany found a path towards a fruitful dynamic to cope with security issues in a European framework and to preserve European security. So, the creation of a Franco-German institutionalized security forum was a preliminary step to favour a better understanding of the two partner’s defence postures. Then, this forum helped France to better express how her defence posture might profit to the Federal Republic and to Europe by large. Finally, this dialogue led to common initiatives (such as the Franco-German brigade or the Franco-German security Council) that effectively inspired the first steps European security project after the end of the Cold War.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-a-weapon-of-the-weak-cyberwarfare-and-china-s-threat-perception 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Simone Dossi

Cyberwarfare is an intensely debated issue both in the policy community and in academia. Among scholars, a major point of discussion is whether the new technology empowers militarily weaker actors against stronger ones. Is cyber technology working as a new weapon of the weak? Or is it rather consolidating the power advantage enjoyed by strong actors in other areas of military competition? The aim of the proposed paper is to address this theoretical issue through a case-study on Chinese perceptions of cyberwarfare. As a rising power, China is a crucial case for the theoretical debate. What is China’s threat perception when it comes to the new technology and its national security implications? Is cyberwarfare perceived as a threat posed by a stronger actor – and, more precisely, a threat posed by the United States? Or is it rather perceived as a threat posed by weaker actors, including regional powers and non-state groups? To answer these questions, the paper will analyse how cyberwarfare is debated in a specialized Chinese journal: Guofang Keji. Established in 1979, this journal is the official publication of the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), the PLA institution in charge of scientific education and research. Over the past decade, Guofang Keji has published several articles on information and communication technology, on cyberspace and cyberwarfare, with a focus not only on the technical aspects of the new domain, but also on its wider strategic implications. Authored by military researchers affiliated to NUDT or other military institutions, these articles help to understand how cyberwarfare is perceived and theorized in China.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-consistent-inconsistency-the-unintended-consequences-of-the-us-spoiling-a-region 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Catherine Jones

Since the election of Donald Trump, there are (even more) fears about the level of commitment of the US to its Asian partners; made more evident by Shinzo Abe being as the first world leader to visit Trump after his election, provocations of and by North Korea, and the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Given these oscillating policies and approaches, how should or can the US’s engagement in East Asia be evaluated? The argument here is that the issues in the Asia-Pacific should not be understood simply as an issue of Trump’s election or as an evaluation of the Obama administration. But, rather that Trump’s inheritance in Asia is a long-term pattern ineffectual political leadership by the US, since the end of the Cold War, which exacerbates the regional security dilemma. This paper makes this argument by identifying leadership as an essential component in the provision of stability and security. Yet, it is in an under-recognised issue in understanding the nature and success of alliances, deterrence, and their interconnection with multilateral institutions.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-coping-with-grey-zone-situations-japan-s-strategy-in-the-east-china-sea 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Cécile Pajon

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-envisaging-alternatives-for-europe-s-nuclear-order 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Elmar Hellendoorn

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-the-atlantic-alliance-s-cohesion-at-risk-current-euro-atlantic-challenges-seen-t 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Frédéric Gloriant

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-the-evolution-of-us-alliances-in-northeast-asia-japan-and-south-korea 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Matteo Dian

The rise of China has determined a process of contestation of the several normative and strategic pillars of the regional order in East Asia, ranging from the regional hierarchy to the US capacity to provide public goods in the region (e.g. security and extended deterrence). This has led the United States and its major partners in East Asia, South Korea and Japan, to put in place a complex strategy that aims to uphold the current regional order while developing a new approach to great power management. On the one hand, this strategy entails the recognition of the new major social status of great power for China, and a quest for cooperation in theatres, such as the Korean peninsula, where it can maintain order. On the other hand, Washington, Tokyo and Seoul have actively cooperated to set limits to the revisionist elements of China’s rise. This has generated a process of evolution in the US-led hub-and-spokes system, in three distinct ways: Tokyo and Seoul have expanded their security roles; the US-Japan and US-ROK bilateral alliances have been consolidated and deepened; and despite significant obstacles generated by domestic politics in South Korea and Japan, limited but significant steps have been taken to turn the bilateral structures into a ‘security triangle’.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-the-resurgence-of-european-insecurity-lessons-learned-and-forgotten-from-the-eur 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Ilaria Paris

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-u-s-end-and-nuclear-use-finally-a-bipolar-problem 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Christine Leah

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-us-chinese-maritime-security-and-the-consequences-for-europe-s-relations-with-wa 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Liselotte Odgaard

The US and China are increasingly engaged in a competition for maritime security that does not merely concern changes in the balance of power, but also the rules underpinning good order at sea. China has been particularly determined to change the rules governing freedom of navigation for military vessels and aircraft. As a subscriber to the law of the sea and freedom of navigation in its widest sense, Europe is becoming increasingly involved in defending the US interpretation of the law of the sea and at the same time adopt a more conciliatory approach to China to avoid contributing to conflict in the maritime domain. This paper addresses Europe’s role in the competition for defining the rules underpinning good order at sea and if Europe contributes to lowering tension levels between the US and China.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-words-matter-donald-trump-and-the-credibility-of-us-extended-nuclear-deterrence 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z 2018-06-15T12:00:00Z Hiroshi Nakatani

Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.