Papers on defence cooperation and military assistance presented at EISS conferences and workshops, newest first. 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z https://eiss-europa.com/feeds/themes/defence-cooperation-and-military-assistance.xml European Initiative for Security Studies https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-from-rebels-to-state-s-justice-post-conflict-justice-choices-in-2026-syria 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Marie Robin

How do rebels deliver justice when they reach power? This contribution examines post-conflict justice choices in Syria following the political transition of December 2024, focusing on how the new leadership under Ahmad al-Sharaa needs to address widespread human rights violations committed during the al-Assad era. These violations include crimes perpetrated both by the former regime (chemical weapons use, torture in detention centers, disappearances) and by non-state armed actors, notably the Islamic State (genocide of Yazidi community, terrorist violence) as well as other militias like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Ahmad al-Sharaa’s group). Drawing on security studies and transitional justice literature, the paper analyzes the emerging Syrian justice architecture and explores how choices of retributive or restorative justice affect stabilization and violence prevention in post-conflict Syria, i.e., how justice choices impact “security.” The analysis examines retributive justice initiatives, including the use of universal jurisdiction by courts in Germany and the United States, alongside the reactivation of Syrian national courts to prosecute serious crimes committed by the former regime and the Islamic State. It assesses how the al-Sharaa’s regime frames these retributive choices within a rather standard conception of security governance, focused on two ends: bringing stabilization (by preventing further violence), and consolidating institutions (to deter further violence). The paper contrasts these choices with restorative justice mechanisms also largely introduced by the new authorities, such as the National Commission for Missing Persons and the National Commission for Transitional Justice. These restorative approaches focus on reconciliation; According to the al-Sharaa’s government, they aim to rebuild trust between civilians and institutions, rather advancing a “human” understanding of security. Will al-Sharaa prosecute crimes by militias (including those of HTS)? Which and whose crimes will be prosecuted?

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-interpreting-counterterrorism-in-african-conflict-management 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Saurav Narain Silvia D'Amato

Scholarly attention to the convergence between international conflict management and counterterrorism has expanded significantly, though with an implicit interpretation of the ‘use of force’ logic, and an emphasis on UN peacekeeping’s downsizing of protection and human rights norms in engagement with the concept (Moe, 2021; Geis and Moe, 2023). Furthermore, terrorism-related violence is on an unprecedented rise in Africa, with several armed conflicts being embroiled with jihadist actors. African states over the last decade have increasingly pursued counterterrorism through informal coalitional arrangements and bilateral interventions, characterised by expansive force mandates and minimal accountability mechanisms. This paper advances a structured conceptual framework for understanding counterterrorism in international conflict management by identifying four analytical tensions: (1) militarisation and ‘use of force’; (2) organisational density and overlap in coalitions; (3) organisational capacity for prevention-focused mandates; (4) localised meaning-making and contested legitimacy. Building on the ADHOCISM dataset (Maglia, Karlsrud & Reykers 2025), we specifically analyse how these tensions manifest across UN-mandated integrated operations, UN-authorised autonomous interventions, and non-UN operations. The goal is to show and explain the critical shift in African conflict governance, characterised by the declining relevance of UN-centric peacekeeping frameworks and a parallel emergence of militarised ad hoc coalitions with differing levels of protection standards.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-mapping-plural-visions-of-peace-the-peace-cube-as-an-analytical-framework 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Yijun Xu Dr Gijsbert Van Iterson Scholten

Recent debates in peacebuilding have moved beyond the liberal peace paradigm to emphasize plural, locally grounded understandings of peace. However, despite this “local turn,” the field still lacks systematic tools for conceptualizing and comparing diverse visions of peace across actors and contexts. This article addresses this gap by proposing a new conceptual framework - the peace cube - as an analytical tool to visualize and compare different visions of peace across actors and contexts. Integrating insights from existing typologies that distinguish between levels, domains, and values of peace, the peace cube offers a multidimensional structure that captures the complexity and relational nature of peace visions. The article demonstrates the utility of this model through the case of Colombia, where the Duque government, civil society groups, and feminist actors articulate distinct yet interrelated understandings of peace. By mapping these visions within a shared conceptual space, the peace cube highlights tensions, overlaps, and potential areas of dialogue between competing perspectives. Ultimately, this approach contributes to a more systematic and plural understanding of peace, offering a practical tool for bridging conceptual divides in peacebuilding theory and practice.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-selling-the-future-of-war-discursive-power-and-military-innovation 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Nicolas Krieger

How do ideas about military technology become politically influential? This paper sets out to examines how competing visions of military technology emerge, gain dominance, and shape German defence planning. It focuses on public debates surrounding ‘classic’ (armour, artillery, etc.) and innovative military technologies (autonomous weapon systems, AI targeting, UAS/UGV, etc.), and analyses whether shifts in discursive prominence are reflected in formal defence planning and procurement decisions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s Zeitenwende. The paper advances an ideational political economy account of military innovation. It argues that under crisis and uncertainty, narratives structure how security problems are defined and which technological solutions appear urgent and legitimate. Private actors, like neo-defence start-ups, promote solutionist narratives presenting innovation as strategically necessary and economically efficient. Through discursive coalitions and epistemic authority claims, certain ideas structure agenda-setting and prioritization in defence planning and procurement while others remain marginal. Empirically, the paper combines large-scale text analysis through Discourse Network Analysis, document analysis, and elite interviews. The core dataset includes roughly three million German newspaper articles (2020-present), defence strategy documents, procurement decisions, capability programmes, and defence firm materials. I trace narrative evolution with Discourse Network Analysis, identify coalitions, and measure shifts in idea dominance (classic versus innovative military technologies), linking these temporally to defence decisions, to demonstrate how ideas become politically influential. This paper aims to answer how competing ideas about military technology shape agenda-setting and procurement in German defence policy and makes three contributions. Empirically, it provides the first systematic, longitudinal mapping of military innovation framing and prioritisation in German defence debates since 2020. Theoretically, it demonstrates how ideational power and solutionist narratives shape security sector prioritization. Methodologically, it shows how discourse network analysis can connect large-scale public debate to defence planning, with implications for understanding how commercially driven narratives influence national security policy.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-socialized-to-cooperate-foreign-military-training-and-coordination-in-un-peaceke 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Ilker Kalin Prof. Carla Martinez Machain

United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are inherently multinational and rely on coordination among national contingents with diverse military cultures, doctrines, and rules of engagement. While existing research shows that mission composition and prior in-mission experience shape peacekeeping effectiveness, we know far less about whether coordination begins before deployment. This paper argues that foreign military training functions as a pre-deployment socialization mechanism that fosters cooperation in multinational peacekeeping settings. Drawing on literature on military socialization and coalition learning, we hypothesize that officers who receive foreign military training—particularly in the United States—develop greater trust in multinational command structures and increased willingness to cooperate with foreign counterparts. We test this argument using a mixed-methods design. First, we field an original vignette experiment with 196 Turkish military officers to examine whether U.S.-trained officers are more willing to comply with operational requests from foreign commanders. Second, we complement the experimental evidence with an observational analysis of UN peacekeeping missions from 1990 to 2016, assessing whether missions with higher proportions of U.S.-trained personnel are more effective in reducing battle-related violence. Our findings suggest that foreign military training is associated with greater openness to international cooperation at the individual level and improved coordination at the mission level. These results contribute to debates on peacekeeping effectiveness by highlighting the micro-level social foundations of coalition cohesion and have policy implications for the design of training and exchange programs.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-the-self-reliance-dilemma-in-conventional-weapons-when-does-india-innovate-inste 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z 2026-06-11T12:00:00Z Ms Yagnyashri Kodaru

Most national defense industries face a dilemma between technological self-reliance and (inter)dependence. While indigenously building weapons increases self-reliance, it can come at the cost of economic and technical efficiency. Conversely, interdependence helps a state integrate into global innovation/production networks and potentially access the most advanced weapons, but forsakes self-reliance for short-term efficiency gains. How do states act in such a dilemma, especially when acquiring large, technologically complex platform weapons systems? Despite being a major rising power, India’s defense industry remains surprisingly understudied in this regard. In this paper, I argue that domestic *belief coalitions* comprising political, military, and technocratic actors shape how India navigates its self-reliance dilemma. In a comparative case study of advanced warship and main battle tank procurement in India, I identify and test the causal role of *techno-nationalist, techno-strategic, and techno-epistemic beliefs* in shaping a higher level of technological self-reliance in naval warfare than in land warfare. My analysis draws on expert interviews with high-level Indian military officials and technocrats, as well as political speeches, policy documents, and strategic doctrines. My findings show that the breadth and robustness of coalitions of different technological beliefs can facilitate defense indigenization and self-reliance or, conversely, entrench existing dependencies by shaping what is seen as feasible and desirable. This paper challenges mainstream systemic and structural explanations of defense technological self-reliance, while enriching sociological and ideational political economy approaches to military innovation and defense studies. My focus on domestic beliefs opens the black box of decision-making in the Indian defense industry, offering an actor-centric perspective on the conditions and drivers that have shaped varied outcomes of the self-reliance dilemma in conventional weapons procurement. India’s emerging role as a significant security and defense industrial actor especially raises the empirical relevance of this research.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-advancing-authoritarian-alignment-a-systematic-mapping-of-defense-diplomacy-betw 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Sabine Mokry

In late 2024, the heated debate about an emerging alliance between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, which had started among U.S. think tankers, reached European policymakers and the public. At first sight, cooperation between these countries appears predominately bilateral and largely focused on support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, systematic empirical research about emerging security ties between these four authoritarian powers is lacking. This paper maps defense cooperation among the four states to start filling this gap. It examines the extent to which these states engage in defense diplomacy activities, including official contacts between senior military and civilian defense officials, appointment of defense attaches, bilateral defense cooperation agreements, training of foreign military and civilian defense personnel, provision of expertise and advice, contacts and exchanges between military personnel and ship visits, placement of military/civilian personnel in partner countries’ defense ministries and armed forces, deployment of training teams, provision of military equipment and other material aid as well as bilateral and multilateral training exercises. Robust links in defense diplomacy between the four countries would indicate growing security ties that might develop into a full-fledged alliance. If that was the case, severe consequences for escalating conflicts around Taiwan, on the Korean peninsula, or in the Middle East are to be expected.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-assisting-to-win-military-assistance-and-coercion-in-war 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Kersti Larsdotter

Coercion is a central strategy for states in an increasingly competitive and hostile international environment, and there are several military means or tools they can use to coerce an opponent into submission, such as, air power, invasions and land grabs, or even nuclear threats. Military assistance, i.e. the training, equipping and advising of foreign state and non-state armed forces to enhance their capability to fight wars, is usually not understood as one of these tools. Instead, research on military assistance tends to focus on the utility of military assistance for the receiving actor, for example, if it contributes to peace, or if it increases the strength of armed forces in the receiving state. Despite the quite extensive use of military assistance in contemporary international relations, we know precariously little about the strategic utility of military assistance for the sponsor state. Do the strengthening of friendly foreign state and non-state armed forces contribute to the coercive power of the sponsor state? Is it a waste of resources? Or could it in fact, contribute to a higher level of threats against the sponsor state? By understanding military assistance as a tool in the strategic toolbox, we can begin to tease out the strategic logic and scrutinize the utility of military assistance for increasing the coercive power as well as security of the sponsor state. In this paper, I will develop the logic of military assistance as a coercive tool and use a plausibility probe to study these dynamics through empirical case studies. In addition to the conceptual elaborations, the paper will demonstrate the general logic of military assistance as a coercive tool as well as the particular mechanisms of its individual subtypes in a number of short empirical case studies.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-belgium-s-defence-policy-after-the-invasion-of-ukraine-a-free-rider-s-business-a 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Michelle Haas Tim Haesebrouck

Belgium is widely known as one of NATO’s most persistent free riders, deprioritizing military investments for decades. Successive budget cuts have left its armed forces weakened and ill-prepared for major geopolitical shifts. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine significantly disrupted the European security order, raising the question: to what extent did this external shock lead to a substantive shift in Belgium’s defence policy? While Belgium swiftly condemned the invasion and aligned with NATO and EU-led initiatives structural constraints - underinvestment, a fragmented political system, and a political elite largely disengaged from defence matters - prevented a substantial policy shift. This paper argues that, despite the external geopolitical shock, policy responses remained largely confined to a traditional reliance on multilateralism and minimal military spending. Although the war prompted minor adjustments, such as a stronger focus on NATO’s Eastern flank over its previous attention to the Sahel, these changes were not transformative. Initial plans to reach the NATO norm of 2% GDP in defence spending by 2035 remained in place, with acceleration to 2029 occurring only after a new federal government took office in 2025. Geographic security and longstanding political inertia continue to limit meaningful adaptation to a shifting security landscape. By examining this case as an example of entrenched free riding, this paper contributes to broader debates on military burden sharing, the ability of smaller states to adapt to shifting geopolitical realities, and the resulting challenges for intra-European defence cooperation.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-beyond-exit-examining-proteges-intra-alliance-bargaining-strategies 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Maximilian Krebs

Military alliances are often seen as hierarchical security institutions where powerful patrons use ‘sticks’ (e.g., threats of abandonment) and ‘carrots’ (e.g., reassurance) to shape the policies of their protégés. However, alliance dynamics are not one-sided. Institutionalized alliances provide protégés with opportunities to bargain for better terms, rather than merely accepting their patron’s preferences or leaving the alliance. Weaker states employ intra-alliance bargaining strategies, such as voicing criticism of the alliance patron, abstaining from military exercises, delaying cooperation, or even evicting allied troops, to extract concessions from their patron. This research investigates the bargaining strategies of alliance protégés vis-à-vis their patrons. It develops a typology of bargaining strategies available to protégés and presents data on their use. Second, the study examines under what conditions these bargaining attempts are effective. Drawing on the case of Armenia's within the Collective Security Treaty Organization - including its absence from CSTO activities and threats to withdraw - this study explores when states choose bargaining over exit and what makes such bargaining effective. By identifying when and how protégés can successfully bargain with their alliance patrons, this research contributes to a better understanding of intra-alliance dynamics and provides insights for policymakers to build enduring security institutions.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-can-european-defence-cooperation-build-european-deterrence 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Fotini Bellou

Is the European Union capable of developing a credible European deterrence? This question is more pressing than ever, particularly in light of the second Trump administration and its inclination toward unilateralism. As the war in Ukraine approaches its third year, the EU’s efforts in defence cooperation have intensified—but have they been effective in meeting the evolving security demands? The return of high-intensity, technologically advanced conventional warfare to the European continent has underscored the urgency of collective defence preparedness. Even before February 2022, EU member states had embarked on efforts to deepen interstate defence cooperation and, to some extent, defence integration. However, these initiatives have been cautiously readjusted to address the new strategic realities. Russia’s war against Ukraine has not only tested European security but has also brought direct threats to neighboring EU states. In response, EU member states have acknowledged—at least on paper—the necessity of multi-domain defence capabilities, culminating in a commitment in November 2023 to enhance their collective military readiness. Yet, has this shift translated into tangible progress toward European deterrence? Have EU states adequately responded to both the new defence imperatives and Ukraine’s calls for support? This paper assesses the EU’s progress by examining shifts in its strategic culture, actual responses to the war in Ukraine, and changes in defence priorities and military spending. It suggests that while EU member states have taken steps to enhance defence cooperation and provide moderate military assistance to Ukraine, these efforts have yet to translate into a more ambitious strategy with a meaningful deterrent impact. There's a need for a fundamental transformation in European defence thinking and capability-building—one that extends beyond the current trajectory. If deterrence is the ultimate goal, merely strengthening cooperation will not suffice; a more profound shift in strategic culture and operational readiness is essential.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-common-threat-diverging-responses-explaining-european-states-military-spending-a 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Tim Haesebrouck Michelle Haas

Defence cooperation - whether through NATO, the EU, or bilateral and multilateral arrangements -plays a crucial role in national security across all European states. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced the importance of military preparedness. However, after three years of war, it is clear that European responses in terms of defence spending have varied significantly. While some countries have substantially increased their military budgets, others have shown only modest adjustments. This paper applies Coincidence Analysis (CNA) to explain these diverging trajectories in European defence spending following Russia’s war in Ukraine. Integrating insights from the literature on military burden sharing and defence economics, we develop a theoretical framework that combines international-level factors, such as threat perception, with domestic-level drivers, including government ideology and fiscal constraints. Our findings indicate that the strongest increases in defence spending occurred in states facing an acute territorial threat from Russia, as well in those that face a significant - though not a territorial - threat, and had previously underinvested in defence. Countries with only moderate threat perceptions but low fiscal constraints and low defence budgets saw intermediate increases, while those facing moderate threats, high existing defence expenditures, or severe fiscal limitations made only minor adjustments. These results suggest the emergence of a three-speed Europe in defence, which can be expected to significantly impact future defence cooperation across the continent: (1) a small group of strong spenders, (2) a large middle group aligning their investments with economic capacity, and (3) a cluster of “free-riders” falling behind. Our study contributes to the broader debate on defence cooperation by illustrating how external threats interact with domestic political and economic factors in shaping national defence policies.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-competitive-cyber-statecraft-of-the-middle-ground-a-neoclassical-realist-model 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Arthur Laudrain Joe Devanny

As cyberspace becomes a central arena for geopolitical competition, middle-ground countries — those neither strictly aligned with Western nor Eastern spheres of influence — play a growing role in shaping cyber governance (Gartzke and Lindsay, 2015; Nye, 2022). Traditional neorealist frameworks, which emphasize balancing and bandwagoning, fail to explain the diversity of cyber sovereignty approaches among these states. This paper applies neoclassical realism (NCR) to analyze how elite perceptions, economic dependencies, and security considerations mediate systemic pressures, leading to varied models of cyber statecraft (Rose, 1998; Kitchen and Tirosh, 2021). The study identifies four distinct cyber sovereignty approaches: strategic alignment, where middle-ground and other smaller states integrate into dominant digital ecosystems for economic benefits (e.g., Ireland, Luxembourg); sovereignty assertion, where states impose digital restrictions based on nationalist or security concerns (e.g., India, Indonesia); selective engagement, where states participate in norm-setting while hedging between major blocs (e.g., ASEAN, South Africa); and pragmatism, where states adopt fluid digital partnerships to maximize flexibility (e.g., Brazil, UAE) (Mueller, 2017; Segal, 2018). By examining the domestic political drivers behind these choices, this paper challenges the liberal assumption that states will internalize global cyber norms through multilateral institutions (Drezner, 2004; DeNardis, 2020). Instead, it argues that economic fragmentation and regional coalitions are shaping the future of cyber governance, with middle-ground states acting as key decision-makers rather than passive rule-takers (Gopinath et al., 2025), contributing to de-centering international relations (IR) (Zambrano Márquez, 2020). The policy implications suggest that major powers and international organizations must engage middle-ground countries as strategic cyber actors rather than treating them as peripheral players. Supporting regional digital coalitions and offering flexible, case-sensitive partnerships will be critical to ensuring a stable, multipolar cyber order. As cyberspace governance fragments, understanding the agency of middle-ground states is essential to shaping the future of international cyber politics.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-do-principles-become-agents-security-assistance-between-cooptation-and-orchestra 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Jean Marie Reure

Under which circumstances is security assistance effective? This article aims to build a theoretical framework to help scholars and practitioners evaluate the effectiveness of security assistance (SA). Security Assistance consists in outsourcing the conduct of stability operations to local partners, increasing their military capacity and professionalism. While existing literature has highlighted SA's diverse and adaptive nature, it lacks an empirically grounded definition of success. By integrating the governor’s dilemma theory with SA literature, this article introduces the concepts of agent control and competence as benchmarks for successful SA. Thus, instead of measuring the extent to which providers achieve their foreign policy goals, this framework assesses SA effectiveness based on the role recipients play as policy intermediaries. This approach facilitates case-specific observations, also allowing for broader generalizations across cases. It constitutes an attempt to provide the practice of SA with a coherent set of concepts concerning the aim, the scope, and the limitations inherent to the relationship between providers and recipients. Therefore, first, the article reviews existing SA and policy evaluation literature. Second, it introduces the competence-control framework and suggests operational measures for control and competence. Third, it discusses preliminary findings along with current limitations and challenges.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-helping-your-friends-in-need-military-interventions-and-the-reliability-of-defen 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Margit Bussmann Maximilian Krebs

Whether a state intervenes militarily in international crises and civil wars depends on the type of relations the two states maintain. Formal alliance and defense cooperation agreements are a costly signal of assistance but not in every case can a country count on its friends. The reliability of cooperation agreements is especially important for smaller states that are dependent on support from a powerful ally. However, many alliances are not honored. Military interventions by former colonial powers need to be reassessed in light of alliance reliability and post-colonial political and economic ties. Contradictory expectations emerge if the protective power maintain close ties to both belligerents, which is especially the case for major powers that pursue broader spheres of interest. This paper will systematically investigate the patterns of French military interventions in Africa and ask why it intervened in some former colonies but not in others. In the past, France often responded to requests for military support when asked by a protégé, while at other times, it remained inactive despite an existing defense cooperation agreement. There is variation of French interventions across countries but also for individual countries over time, such as in Chad where France intervened frequently but not in all critical situations. Relying on data from the Thorette report on French military operations abroad and the International Military Intervention dataset, we will assess the relative importance of defense cooperation agreements. Accounting for various opportunities that arise in the potential target state, such as military coups, rebellions, and international militarized disputes, we will investigate under what conditions the French government decided to send military support. A better understanding of whether France has been a reliable alliance partner or intervened selectively depending on its own geostrategic and economic interests will help explaining why it lost ground in Africa.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-informal-is-the-new-normal-command-and-control-as-the-choice-for-the-functional 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Joseph Christian Agbagala

Since the end of the Cold War, the decline in the formation of formal treaty-based alliances has coincided with a volatile security environment and the rise of network-enabled military capabilities. Developments such as the US push to prepare for network-centric warfare since the late 1990s, the growing interest in developing weapons systems through partnerships, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact, and Switzerland and Singapore’s decisions to procure F-35s, which feature improved situational awareness through advanced sensor-to-shooter connectivity, highlight a shift toward informal alliances. This shift reflects states' significant interest in leveraging technological advancements and establishing arrangements that offer flexibility and adaptability in achieving greater security without the rigid and costly commitments of formal treaties. This study develops a theoretical framework to explain why states choose informal alliances in such conditions. Drawing on institutionalist and functionalist theories of international relations, security studies, and command and control (C2) literature, I argue that the volatile security environment drives states to choose informal alliances because C2 establishes an organizational framework for security commitment that reduces the alliance risks and costs (opportunism, uncertainty, and risks of abandonment or entrapment) while facilitating political-strategic interoperability and operational adaptability between states which enables them to achieve greater security. The C2 framework introduces dimensions that allocate decision rights, designate interaction patterns, specify information distribution, and enable states to exploit and leverage technological opportunities at both the political-strategic and operational levels of interoperability. These dimensions create a “relational-flexibility” framework that links actors’ security commitment at the political-strategic level with the operational level, achieving functional security commitment without requiring binding formal treaties or institutionalized frameworks. This research aims to contribute to alliance studies by addressing gaps in the literature on informal security arrangements and the underexplored role of C2 in shaping alliance behavior, deterrence, and defense objectives.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-reassessing-european-security-the-drivers-of-nato-s-response-to-hybrid-threats-s 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Laura Lisboa

Russia’s actions against Ukraine in 2014 led to a reassessment of the European security environment by the West. NATO reinforced its military presence in Eastern Europe and developed measures to counter hybrid threats, which were strengthened after 2022. Although hybrid threats are not new per se, their use over the past decade has posed new strategic challenges to the West. This paper aims to identify the structural and normative drivers behind NATO's approach to hybrid threats through policy analysis and International Relations theory. We first map early European responses to hybrid threats and trace NATO's evolving approach. The term 'hybrid threats' often refers to activities that undermine stability without escalating to direct military conflict. Its widespread use, however, tells us little about the underlying drivers of these responses, which remain underexplored. From a structural standpoint, we assess whether changes in the balance of power and the unexpected use of hybrid threats to achieve political goals made them more central to European security concerns. Drawing on liberal and realist perspectives, we also explore how growing interdependence changes international conflict, increases vulnerability to hybrid threats, and reveals the limits of traditional military responses. From a normative perspective, we analyze how the evolution of domestic and international norms drove responses to hybrid threats. Addressing conventional and hybrid threats in European states requires enhanced multinational coordination and society-wide security efforts. Hybrid threats, in particular, challenge the logic of proportionality in direct responses and deterrence strategies and prompt a reevaluation of norms such as non-interference or the balance between sovereignty and collective security. Finally, we examine how the erosion of democratic norms within European states has made them more susceptible to hybrid threats, and how NATO’s strategies have evolved to prevent adversaries from exploiting internal divisions and undermining democratic processes without triggering direct military confrontation.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-small-state-defense-cooperation-and-security-strategies-in-a-changing-global-ord 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Revecca Pedi

This paper examines how small states adapt their defense strategies in a shifting global order shaped by intensifying great power competition, emerging regionalisms, and evolving security dynamics. It argues that small states enhance their defense posture through a mix of hard and soft balancing, shelter-seeking, and diversified security partnerships. Using Greece as a case study, the paper explores how it navigates regional tensions with Turkey while balancing ties with key allies such as the EU, the U.S., and France. Through defense agreements, strategic investments, and regional minilateral initiatives, Greece illustrates how small states can leverage multiple partnerships to bolster security and status. Despite growing security pressures, small states also gain agency through networked cooperation and strategic diversification. The findings contribute to the broader discussion on small state security, demonstrating how adaptive defense strategies can mitigate vulnerabilities in an unpredictable international environment.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-sweden-and-the-league-of-nations-the-partisan-contestation-of-national-identity 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Zigne Edström

When the Swedish Social Democratic Party shifted its stance on NATO membership in the spring of 2022, broad parliamentary consensus to divert from Sweden’s tradition of non-alignment to pursue collective security was achieved. A century earlier Sweden had contemplated similar trade-offs before joining the world’s first international organisation based on the principles of conflict mediation, disarmament, and collective action. Yet, neither in 2022 nor in 1920 such decisions were taken without opposition. This paper explores Sweden’s engagements in the League of Nations, and places its recent divergence from the traditional non-alignment policy in a historical perspective. While the options before the First World War had been between national neutrality or military alliance, the question was to what extent Sweden should have trust in collective security. Special attention is therefore given to Sweden’s participation in the LoN in times of crisis and conflict, including critics’ responses to these engagements. An emphasis is placed on how the small and post-neutral state made sense of the dilemma between its traditional security practices and the new internationalist ideals. Drawing on a wide range of archival sources, the paper illustrates how contestation often took place across dimensions of partisan affiliation and ideological discourse, generating both shared and competing understandings of Sweden’s role and identity in institutionalised international cooperation on issues of security and defence.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-the-delegation-of-defense-and-security-responsibilities-at-sea-in-historical-per 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Pieter Zhao

The maritime warfare and security environment of the 21st century is changing. The proliferation of non-traditional maritime security threats, such as piracy, maritime terrorism, and illegal fishing, combined with the emergence of gray-zone warfare at sea through irregular actors, attests to this change. As a result, the international norms surrounding the use of force at sea are evolving as well, as states are increasingly delegating defense and security capabilities, traditionally considered exclusively state or military terrain, to non-state, nonmilitary, and irregular actors. Current scholarship generally analyzes these examples in isolation and fails to consider the broader framework of the changing maritime warfare and security environment to identify the dynamics underpinning this development. Moreover, while current scholarship commonly assumes that these are novel phenomena, the historical record includes a long-standing tradition of non-state and irregular maritime warfare and security actors, including the privateers and mercantile companies of the early-modern period. As a result, these contemporary examples could be considered symptoms of a more significant 21st-century development, representing the historical dynamism surrounding the international norms of maritime warfare and security. My PhD research project aims to analyze this development by combining traditional historical methods based on written primary source material with international relations theory and expert interviews. As an example of applied history, the project aims to operationalize historical precedents to better inform current policymakers and military leadership about the maritime security challenges of the future.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-the-eu-s-collective-defence-framework-a-law-in-context-analysis-of-article-42-7 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z 2025-06-26T12:00:00Z Federica Fazio

Since the onset of the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the European Union (EU) has acted with unity and cohesion, taking unprecedented steps, particularly in defence. Although the illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has re-emphasised the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the backbone of Europe's territorial defence, a legal basis exists for the EU to play a role in collective defence. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty introduced into the EU's constitutional framework a collective defence obligation similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT). Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) commits EU Member States to assist one another in the event of armed aggression. Additionally, a solidarity obligation codified in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) requires the EU and its Member States to support any Member State in the event of terrorist attacks. These norms have seemingly attracted little attention from legal scholars. With the war in Ukraine intensifying, concerns over Trump undermining NATO’s mutual security guarantee and the increasing likelihood of military attacks on Europe, understanding how credible the EU’s mutual defence commitment is, how it would be operationalised and how it interplays with the EU’s solidarity commitment, as well as with NATO’s own mutual defence commitment, is of the utmost importance. This paper conducts a law-in-context analysis of the EU’s mutual assistance clause, drawing insights from European security scholarship and paying special attention to the historical, geopolitical, and strategic context in which the clause was adopted and has come to operate. To this end, the 1948 Brussels Treaty, 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty, 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, and 2007 Lisbon Treaty will be analysed. EU security strategies and EU-NATO Joint Declarations will also be examined.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-european-defence-policy-changes-in-response-to-russia-s-2022-invasion-of-ukraine 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Michelle Haas

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine would be expected to constitute an external shock sufficient to cause a dramatic transformation of the defence policies of European countries. Political leaders have frequently referred to this critical event as a ‘wake-up call for Europe’. Yet, defence policy experts generally suggest that this perceived sense of urgency has not yet translated into a transformative development of European defence integration. Research indicates that defence policy remains primarily a matter of national importance. However, a comprehensive overview of the changes in the EU member states’ and European NATO allies’ national defence policies after February 2022 has not yet been compiled. This article aims to address this gap in empirical knowledge by triangulating the results of expert interviews with document analysis to assess changes in European defence policies on three dimensions: (1) European defence budgets and equipment investments, (2) the objectives of European defence policies and (3) defence cooperation among European states. Subsequently, it builds on literature on Foreign Policy Change and NATO burden-sharing to develop a theoretical framework aimed at explaining the (varying) impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on European defence policies.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-international-military-assistance-a-historical-and-conceptual-genealogy 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Thibault Fouillet

International Military Assistance (IMA) is undergoing a major revival in the light of the war in Ukraine, in which it is a fundamental marker, both in terms of the ability of the players to last in a war of attrition (Western support for Ukraine, North Korean and Iranian support for Russia) and as a means of indirect action for the benefit of the states providing the aid. While this case study is essential and will not fail to be referred to, this contribution aims to move beyond the specific case to examine International Military Assistance as a foreign policy tool. The purpose of this contribution is to carry out a conceptual and historical study of military assistance. It will then be seen that the common definition based on the four pillars of Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip is a protean implementation, strongly determined by the international context in which it takes place. An essential but not easy distinction with co-belligerence will be made, providing a welcome conceptual perspective for the other contributions on the panel, which will look at contemporary case studies in IMA. Finally, a brief presentation of the history of IMA will also be given to provide a comparative overview, both in terms of the evolution of doctrines (particularly since the founding American document of 1976 establishing the creation of Foreign Internal Defense dedicated to military assistance) and in terms of the variety of practices, from lease loans and the supply of equipment (cf. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949) to indirect intervention by foreign volunteers (ex: Spanish Civil War). In conclusion, this contribution is intended as a theoretical and historical characterization of IMA and defense cooperation, which will provide a conceptual introduction to the analysis of specific cases in the remainder of the panel.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-navigating-the-indo-pacific-a-comparative-analysis-of-asean-and-quad-frameworks 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Giorgia Piovesan

The Indo-Pacific region has experienced a notable surge in the establishment and consolidation of new multilateral and minilateral frameworks, largely driven by the shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by China's growing influence. Notably, he Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, has advanced through intensive and regular cooperation to address pressing challenges in the region such as climate protection and health policy to maritime security. Concurrently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a political and economic union representing 10 states in Southeast Asia, has progressively expanded its objectives to encompass the establishment of a shared security regime, in ordeer to contrast political repression by member states, narcotics trafficking,and terrorism. However, a noticeable research gap persists in the current literature regarding the ASEAN and Quad frameworks comparison. This paper aims to delve into the evolving dynamics within these two entities, meticulously scrutinizing the intricate interplay of differences, convergences, and emerging challenges within the evolving geopolitical landscape. The research will unfold in several key dimensions. Firstly, it will thoroughly examine the impact of changing geopolitical dynamics on joint military exercises, capacity-building efforts, and trainings for defense cooperation. Secondly, an in-depth analysis of existing charters and members' declarations will be conducted to illuminate the formal structures and commitments of both ASEAN and the Quad. Thirdly, the research will delve into the ASEAN-Quad bilateral relations with countries in the region —specifically South Korea, Mongolia, and Pakistan— providing a comprehensive understanding of the interconnectedness of these frameworks. Finally, the paper will undertake examine and analyze the interactions between ASEAN and the Quad. This comparative approach will shed light on the distinct roles, contributions, and potential collaborations between the two frameworks, thereby contributing to a more nuanced understanding of defence cooperation dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-trapped-in-the-strategic-trilemma-ukraine-s-role-in-the-black-sea-region-2014-20 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Viktoriia Vdovychenko Marc De Vore

The Black Sea stands out as a region of heightened complexity due to the divergent military, economic, and legal interests among its littoral states. Faced with the challenge of pursuing discordant objectives, its states’ policies towards this arena oftentimes appear incoherent. In this volatile geopolitical landscape, characterized by risks and intense competition, a nuanced understanding of the dynamics at play is imperative. We argue that the concept of the strategic “trilemma” best explains these dynamics. To demonstrate the heuristic utility of trilemmas for understanding Black Sea geopolitics, we examine in Ukraine’s case in depth. At its most basic, a strategic trilemma is a situation when a government pursues three distinct objectives, yet where only two can logically be achieved at the same time. For Ukraine, the three imperatives that Ukraine faces in the Black Sea include: 1) upholding/restoring national sovereignty over its 1991 borders; 2) deterring/defending against Russia, and 3) upholding a regional order favorable to Ukraine’s economic development. We demonstrate the utility of the strategic trilemma concept by examining how successive Ukrainian governments sought to reconcile these conflicting imperatives. We draw on various sources, to provide a detailed account of how Ukraine navigated sequential crises in the Black Sea, including Russia’s seizure of Sevastopol and efforts through proxies to expand along the Sea of Azov, Russia’s construction of the Azov Bridge and efforts to claim the Kerch Straits as “internal” wars. Moreover, we suggest that the strategic trilemmas that littoral states face are a key factor complicating Ukrainian, Turkish, Romanian and Bulgarian efforts towards defence cooperation in the face of Russian revisionism. By understanding the trilemmas confronting Black Sea states, we can better conceptualize the forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation that could roll back and contain Russia’s efforts to dominate the Black Sea.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-winning-the-battle-for-hearts-and-minds-u-s-reassurance-during-the-russo-ukraini 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z 2024-06-27T12:00:00Z Alexander Lanoszka Stephen Herzog Lauren Sukin

How effective were U.S. attempts at reassuring its allies and partners in the wake of the February 2022 Russian re-invasion of Ukraine? During this major crisis moment, the United States implemented a wide-ranging series of policies to support Ukraine, to deter Russia, and to reassure its NATO allies. These actions included broad sanctions, enhanced U.S. force presence in Central and Eastern Europe, and repeated verbal assurances. Yet these actions stopped short of a military intervention, with Washington refusing to impose a no-fly-zone or send forces to Ukraine. In handling this crisis, Washington had to contend with diverse allies and partners, who differed prior to the war on their willingness to engage with or to contain Russia. The United States thus faced a major reassurance challenge, the management of which could strengthen cohesion among its many partners or create major splits. Using surveys of public opinion in 23 countries on 6 continents, we evaluate whether and why U.S. reassurance efforts in the wake of the war succeeded. We find that the measured U.S. response to the crisis was generally lauded internationally. This finding shows that worries about the U.S. ability to balance the interests of NATO allies with those of its partners in East Asia and the Global South did not materialize.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-a-quiet-place-assessing-ssbn-vulnerability-in-the-arctic-ocean 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Nicholas Blanchette

How secure are secure second-strike nuclear forces? For many, secure second-strike capability has been embodied by nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), whether deployed in open-ocean patrol patterns or in naval bastions. The historical record, however, highlights significant variation in the relative survivability of deterrent forces due to technological advancements in weapon accuracy and intelligence. This paper evaluates vulnerability with respect to SSBNs. Specifically, it focuses on the vulnerability of Russian sea-based nuclear deterrent forces in the Barents Sea to U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms engaged in an effort to trail SSBNs. Examining undersea competition in the Arctic using the campaign analysis method, this paper asks two questions. First, how vulnerable are Russian SSBNs? And second, how effectively can U.S. attack submarines (SSNs) detect and trail SSBNs in the Barents Sea? After considering the oceanographic characteristics of the campaign’s environment and the availability and capability of U.S. and Russian forces operating in the Arctic, this study argues that U.S. SSNs would likely struggle to effectively and covertly trail Russian SSBNs in the Barents Sea. Importantly, U.S. challenges do not equate to Russian advantages in ASW against the United States. Instead, in an environment characterized by shallow water and ever-quieter submarines, both sides risk playing “blind man’s bluff” in the Barents.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-alliance-cohesion-and-military-manoeuvres-a-signal-of-deterrence-or-assurance 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Margit Bussmann

Military alliances routinely conduct military drills to practice interoperability, often unnoticed by the public. At times, however, military maneuvers are highly publicized events. This brings up the question whether these maneuvers are primarily intended for enhancing internal readiness and alliance cohesion or whether they are carried out to convey a sense of resolve to the outside world. Based on deterrence theory military exercises can be a mechanism to convey a credible threat and signal resolve to an adversary; and in case of extended deterrence a signal to allies that the protection will hold. Military exercises can also help in preparing prospective members to the alliance and create trust among former belligerents. With the help of quantitative analysis using data on joint military exercises we will assess whether regular military exercises among alliances partners contribute to more cohesion and more serious alliance commitments. We will also investigate whether military exercises with non-allied partners prepare for the accession of new members. Our results will shed light on the broader geo-political implications of this phenomenon.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-changing-threat-perceptions-and-american-grand-strategy-evidence-from-maritime-m 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Peter Dombrowski Simon Reich

Military exercises are largely overlooked by scholars of international security, despite the fact that their planning, executing and subsequent analysis represents a huge investment of any military’s time. There are, of course, a few exceptions (eg. Caravelli, 1983; Heuser, Heier and Lasconjarias, 2018; Kuo and Blankenship, 2022; Malley and Wirtz, 2022) and a handful of enterprising scholars have even generated databases concerning some forms of exercises (eg. Bernhardt, 2022) Yet the study of military exercises remains inexplicably thin given their significance as a metric of national strategy and the wealth of analytic data that they offer on the hundreds of exercises that take place annually by militaries across the globe. We begin to redress this oversight within the conceptual and empirical space limitations imposed by a paper.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-credibility-in-crises-how-patrons-reassure-in-crises 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Lauren Sukin

How do citizens of U.S. allies assess different reassurance strategies? This article investigates the effects of U.S. reassurance policies on public opinion in allied states. We design and conduct a survey experiment in five Central-Eastern European states---Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania---in March 2022. Set against the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, this experiment asked respondents to evaluate four types of reassurance strategies, each critical tools in U.S. crisis response policy: military deployments, diplomatic summitry, economic sanctions, and public reaffirmations of security guarantees. The international security literature typically attaches great importance to capabilities in providing deterrence and reassurance benefits, while dismissing public reaffirmations as mostly `cheap talk' and economic sanctions as being largely ineffective. Yet we find preferences for the use of economic sanctions and public statements as reassurance strategies during crises, in part because these approaches help states manage escalation risks.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-eu-arms-collaboration-and-procurement-the-impact-of-the-war-in-ukraine 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Jonata Anicetti

In May 2021, a study commissioned by the European Parliament claimed that most Member States in Eastern Europe are reluctant to engage in intra-EU defence industry cooperation and prefer to buy American military hardware as an integral part of their strategic partnership with the US. Less than one year later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should thus have widened this purported West-East divide. And yet, in March 2022, just a few weeks after the invasion and with the EU busy stimulating MS’ collaborative investments in joint projects and joint procurement of defence capabilities, it was a Western European country such as Germany who suddenly procured three squadrons of US-made F-35 fighter aircraft. In fact, by investigating MS arms collaboration and procurement over the period 2014-2023 through both primary and secondary sources, this paper shows that no such divide exists. When it comes to the procurement of foreign weapons, Western and Eastern MS show similar EU/extra-EU ratios, with France actually buying less European than Hungary. As for arms collaboration, rather than a West-East divide, the findings strongly suggest the existence of a large-small divide within the EU, with smaller MS typically avoiding high-end PESCO projects in favour of defence offsets. Indeed, whereas larger MS can negotiate favourable workshare arrangements, contrary to elsewhere argued, smaller ones do not expect to reap technology transfer benefits from arms collaboration. Overall, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a negative impact on EU defence cooperation. Virtually all new joint development and procurement initiatives have occurred through a NATO framework and may well eventually see the participation of the US, or the procurement of extra-EU weapons. Moreover, EU defence supply chains expand (e.g. US, Israel) and extend (e.g. South Korea) considerably, thus putting into further question EU defence cooperation as well as EU strategic autonomy more broadly.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-mightier-yet-explaining-british-military-underconfidence-in-reference-to-anglo-a 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Sylvain Thoni

Great Britain during the Second World War is commonly remembered, both by laymen and academics, as having been barely able to defend itself against overwhelming German strength after the fall of France in May 1940 until the entry of the United States into the war decisively swayed the balance of forces. This image is however mistaken as the British war effort was both modern and vigorous while the make-up of the German armed forces and its supporting economy were largely backward. I employ realist balance of power and balance of threat theory to argue that Great Britain attempted to expedite Anglo-American alliance formation processes by intentionally inculcating a sense of military underconfidence. By overstating its own military and economic weaknesses and exaggerating Germany’s military power British policymakers communicated a far more dire image to American policymakers than was warranted by the actual war situation. Empirical evidence from 25 May 1940 and 11 March 1941 relating to the British war situation regarding shipping, finance and materiel suggests that there were notable differences in public communications to the United States and the private assessments entertained in the British War council. It thus seems relevant to further research the role of inculcated military underconfidence in alliance formation processes within a multi-stage research strategy.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-military-assistance-within-the-framework-of-the-defence-of-the-liberal-internati 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Rocío Vales Calderón

The United States has maintained a grand strategy of liberal hegemony since the end of the Cold War. On this matter, such a strategy would consist of maintaining and defending what G. John Ikenberry has called the liberal international order, which was established and promoted in the first place because it advanced US interests around the world. However, the emergence of a series of revisionist powers in recent decades has called into question the future of this order. Indeed, these revisionist ambitions were best portrayed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. On this point, the threat that this growing revisionism represents for the survival of the rules-based order has been recognized in the National Security Strategy published in October 2022 by the Biden-Harris Administration, where it is recognized that the greatest challenge is posed by autocracies with revisionist ambitions, which by the way would represent a slight change on the Administration's approach to competition. Thus, faced with the Russian aggression, the United States has decided to contribute together with its European allies to reinforce the Ukrainian defense, framing such military assistance in a defense of the liberal international order amid an acknowledged context of competition between the great powers. Nevertheless, how does military assistance to Ukraine fit into the US grand strategy and the strategic competition between great powers?

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-nato-and-multi-domain-operations-between-deterrence-and-conflict 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Mauro Gilli Andrea Gilli Nina Silove

Authors: Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Nina Silove In recent years, the United States and its Allies have adopted the concept of Multi-Domain Operations to handle the return of Great Powers’ rivalry, the diffusion of anti-access/area-denial capabilities, as well as the opportunities and vulnerabilities generated by emerging technologies – including cyberattacks and manipulation of the information space. MDOs represent an attempt to achieve military superiority in a more complex and contested world against near-peer competitors, neutralizing coercion, managing escalation as well as penetrating segregated environments by seamlessly exploiting capabilities belonging to different domains. The planning and conduct of MDOs requires, however, an extensive transformation: existing force structures will have to be re-calibrated for maneuvering across strategic distances; current formations will have to develop the capacity, capability and endurance to operate across multiple contested domains against capable adversaries; armed forces will have to achieve cross-domain synergies to launch multiple forms of attack through the rapid, continuous, coordinated and disciplined integration of capabilities from all domains. Such transformations entails severe challenges, primarily in terms of command and control, capabilities development and strategic planning, as well as digitalization, standardization and human capital. At the NATO level, such challenges are further exacerbated due to traditional dilemmas of coalition warfare and alliance management, including intelligence and capability sharing, harmonization and doctrinal alignment. The article looks at these challenges, highlighting the obstacles NATO Allies need to overcome for deterrence as well as winning future conflicts.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-nato-s-nordic-neophytes-sweden-and-finland-s-accession-to-nato 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Samuel Seitz Julia Carver

Does the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO alter the strategic balance in the Baltic? The recent decision by Sweden and Finland to join the alliance has rendered most analyses on this question moot, as extant scholarship has focused on how the two countries could cooperate with NATO outside the alliance. To redress this gap, this paper assesses how Nordic NATO expansion shifts the military balance in northeast Europe using a mixed-methods approach with campaign models and elite interviews. Specifically, it employs logistics and combat models to evaluate Russia’s ability to deploy force against Finland. It further assesses the implications of the extension of the Russia-NATO border on force density levels and Baltic conflict scenarios. Finally, it models how control of the port of Stockholm and island of Gotland alters NATO maritime logistics capacity in the event of the closure of the Suwalki Gap. Our findings suggest the addition of Sweden and Finland meaningfully diminishes Russian force projection capabilities while simultaneously increasing NATO’s regional maritime control and logistical capacity. Interviews allow us to corroborate these findings against the strategic assessments of key NATO and European policymakers, to explore how NATO officials’ perceptions of strategic balance shape their engagement with and understanding of feasible operational concepts vis-à-vis the Baltic, and to probe the extent to which their strategic judgements mirror popular discourse around NATO expansion. Our findings contribute to the academic literature on territorial control and conflict, and they have important implications for ongoing policy debates by suggesting that NATO’s Nordic expansion is net positive for the alliance. It substantially enhances the regional power of the alliance and reduces the viability of a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-re-bordering-nato-the-strategic-dilemmas-of-yesterday-and-tomorrow 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Maria Sofia Macedo

Borderwork and its connection with strategic dilemmas have seldom been reflected in the academic literature on NATO. Territorial expansion of any international organisation is associated with constructing new borders, as the former internal and external differentiations need to be replaced. At the same time, new borders and related borderwork produce additional challenges in ensuring the new members are reined in, and the organisation is adapted to a new strategic environment. We argue this connection can be seen in the case of NATO expansion in the 1990s and early 2000s. A novel set of (re-)bordering practices was introduced, reflecting the longer border to be defended outwardly and inculcating the new differentiations on the inside. The installation of NATO-standard radios to supplement Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems on new members’ MiG-29 aircrafts, concerns over the Suwałki Gap, or accession’s democratic requirements illustrate this perspective. Such changes led not only to opportunities that NATO could pursue from its renewed geopolitical setting but also to a redefinition of challenges which required a more robust posture to deter adversaries and defend the expanded Alliance area. The presented paper thus identifies a connection between required bordering practices and the strategic dilemmas the Alliance had to face. In this regard, we use comparative analysis to examine the proposed relationship during and after NATO’s post-Cold War expansion and apply our findings to the potential integration of Finland and Sweden.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-allied-defence-dilemma-balancing-between-autonomy-and-alliance-cohesion 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Lotje Boswinkel

Against the backdrop of both an exacerbation of the threat environment and growing uncertainty about the reliability of the US security guarantee, in recent years allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have begun reinforcing their militaries. Such efforts were framed as necessary, at least in part, for the sake of alliance cohesion: greater burden-sharing would make the alliance more attractive as it would render the US commitment less costly. Reality is more complex, however. Asymmetric alliances typically have both a ‘capability aggregating’ and ‘control’ value, and therefore increased protégé strength can upset the terms on which an alliance is based, potentially pushing a patron away. Aware of the risks that come with this trade-off between greater spending and alliance cohesion, protégés adopt various strategies to mitigate the potential loss in patron commitment and as such maximise their security (getting both arms and allies). This project examines how these protégé defence efforts reflect different calculations of the potential costs and benefits of increased burden-sharing. It hypothesises that allied defence strategies are shaped by protégé perceptions of both the abandonment cost and probability. Variation within these variables leads them to pursue autonomy-focused or patron-leaning defence strategies. To test this claim, this project examines the evolution in defence strategies among four US middle power allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific throughout the Cold War, post-Cold War period and current era.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-united-states-and-the-eternal-dream-of-missile-defence 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Sanne Verschuren

Why and how do states decide to develop different weapon systems within a similar domain of warfare? For example, why does the United States invest in ever-more expansive forms of national missile defense, while France briefly dabbled in such matters and the United Kingdom has been reluctant to do so? Contrary to the assumption in the existing literature that states know the future threat environment and are able to develop suitable military technology in response to it, I argue that ideas, particularly those about the future, play a critical role in shaping states' decisions about military technology. Because the future is unknown, domestic actors imagine radically different future states of the world. These ideas—what I call “images of warfare,” consisting of actors' construction of future threat environment and their theory of victory—shape actors' preferences for weapons systems. Not all of these ideas, however, are equally influential. In order to transform their ideas into actual capabilities, actors need to build cross-cutting coalitions within the broader defense community around their “imagined security interests.” The ability of these actors to build such a coalition and funnel their ideas through the state's decision-making process is shaped by the political opportunity structure, more specifically the level of openness of the relevant institutions. I explore these dynamics through an in-depth case study of the development of missile defense capabilities in the United States from the 1980s until the mid-1990s.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-us-preponderance-in-nato-the-role-of-logistics-intelligence-training-cyber-and-c 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z 2023-06-22T12:00:00Z Alexandra Chinchilla Jordan Becker Stephen Brooks Hugo Meijer William Wohlforth

To meet the pacing challenge of a rising China, the United States seeks to devote increased resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific. Some have argued that the United States can free up resources by withdrawing most or all of its troops from Europe. After a US drawdown, the European members of NATO would make up for the loss of US manpower and equipment, though the United States would still provide C4ISR and a nuclear umbrella to its European allies. We argue that the US contribution to its NATO allies is much broader than manpower, equipment, C4ISR, and nuclear deterrence—and maintaining this larger contribution requires US boots on the ground in Europe. The United States provides important contributions to NATO allies in four main areas, which we term LITC: logistics, intelligence/information technology, training, and coordination. LITC includes the US contribution to multinational logistics efforts to transport, supply, and sustain NATO allies’ troops in the event of a war; strategic intelligence and offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; training activities, exercises, and broader ways in which the United States shares knowledge within NATO; and US coordination of allied procurement, war plans, and alliance decision-making. We show how US contributions in these areas cannot be easily replicated by the European members of NATO. Furthermore, substantially reducing US troop presence in Europe saves little money yet reduces its ability to provide LITC. Finally, we evaluate US alliances in the Indo-Pacific and offer recommendations for improving LITC provision to improve integrated deterrence in the region.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-military-assistance-and-national-security 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z Kersti Larsdotter

Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-military-expenditure-external-threats-and-fiscal-consolidation-a-survey-experime 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z Alessia Aspide Jordan Becker Matthew Di Giuseppe

Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-the-migration-defence-nexus-unravelling-the-effect-of-migration-on-defence-effor 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z Daphné Charotte

Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-understanding-nato-entanglement-in-non-member-conflicts-evidence-from-bosnia-199 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z 2022-06-30T12:00:00Z Stefano Recchia

Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-arms-without-influence-defense-industrial-policy-and-burden-sharing-in-the-trans 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Jordan Becker

The allocation of resources and the sharing of defense burdens among members of the transatlantic security community is central to the defense of the liberal international order. It is also a fundamental component of that order in itself. While economists have shed light on variation in burden-sharing behavior among states and measured as top-line defense spending, only qualitative work in the security studies field has addressed the nature of contributions to shared priorities. Neither field has explicitly addressed spending on modernizing defense capabilities, which is of primary interest to policy-makers aiming to mitigate burden-shifting tendencies in alliances. I find the larger the weight of arms production is in its national economy, the more a state spends on shared transatlantic priorities. This finding suggests that the strategic effects of defense industrial policy, and particularly the distribution of defense industries across Europe, extend beyond the production of defense articles and into the politics of burden sharing. The finding is robust to multiple statistical modeling choices. It also finds support from primary source archival evidence and participant interviews.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-eu-military-capabilities-in-the-post-cold-war-a-response-to-systemic-pressures 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Bruna Rohr Reisdoerfer

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-how-minilateralism-shapes-nato-s-decision-making-process 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Christelle Calmels

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-offsetting-brexit-in-defence-cooperation-trust-matters 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Ben Kienzle Richard Whitman Mark Webber

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-to-what-extent-eu-s-effective-multilateralism-is-an-adequate-mean-to-counter-hyb 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z 2021-09-03T12:00:00Z Pascal Carlucci

Presented at EISS 2021. No abstract on file yet.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/JPW2019-change-in-burden-sharing-mind-set-in-nato 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Dominika Kunertova

Ambiguous American commitments to European security, Brexit, national populist forces and the lack of political leadership have put NATO under stress and challenged its cohesion, which represents the Alliance's centre of gravity. Counterintuitively, burden-sharing as a set of institutionalised cooperative practices can strengthen that cohesion, yet since the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge the debate has gone out of balance, focusing almost exclusively on the 2 percent of GDP spending figure and further polarising the allies. This paper re-examines the Alliance's philosophy of burden-sharing along the lines of Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, introducing a mutual-aid dimension into NATO's cash-capabilities-contributions framework to emphasise what member countries can do together rather than what divides them. Moving beyond defence accounting to the quality and effectiveness of burden-sharing, and stressing that allies cannot simply buy interoperability, it argues that a conceptually well-adjusted burden-sharing narrative can improve cohesion and enhance interoperability as the ability to act as a group, and concludes with recommendations for achieving greater cohesion and more interoperable armed forces.

https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-lifting-pooling-and-sharing-to-a-higher-level-the-european-air-transport-command 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z 2019-06-13T12:00:00Z Carolyn Moser

Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.