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  <title>EISS Anthology — Arms acquisition and transfer</title>
  <subtitle>Papers on arms acquisition and transfer presented at EISS conferences and workshops, newest first.</subtitle>
  <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/feeds/themes/arms-acquisition-and-transfer.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml"/>
  <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology-atlas/theme/arms-acquisition-and-transfer.html"/>
  <updated>2026-06-11T12:00:00Z</updated>
  <id>https://eiss-europa.com/feeds/themes/arms-acquisition-and-transfer.xml</id>
  <author><name>European Initiative for Security Studies</name></author>
  <entry>
    <title>The Self-Reliance Dilemma in Conventional Weapons: When does India Innovate Instead of Import?</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-the-self-reliance-dilemma-in-conventional-weapons-when-does-india-innovate-inste.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2026-the-self-reliance-dilemma-in-conventional-weapons-when-does-india-innovate-inste</id>
    <updated>2026-06-11T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2026-06-11T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Ms Yagnyashri Kodaru</name></author><summary>Most national defense industries face a dilemma between technological self-reliance and (inter)dependence. While indigenously building weapons increases self-reliance, it can come at the cost of economic and technical efficiency. Conversely, interdependence helps a state integrate into global innovation/production networks and potentially access the most advanced weapons, but forsakes self-reliance for short-term efficiency gains. How do states act in such a dilemma, especially when acquiring large, technologically complex platform weapons systems? Despite being a major rising power, India’s defense industry remains surprisingly understudied in this regard. In this paper, I argue that domestic *belief coalitions* comprising political, military, and technocratic actors shape how India navigates its self-reliance dilemma. In a comparative case study of advanced warship and main battle tank procurement in India, I identify and test the causal role of *techno-nationalist, techno-strategic, and techno-epistemic beliefs* in shaping a higher level of technological self-reliance in naval warfare than in land warfare. My analysis draws on expert interviews with high-level Indian military officials and technocrats, as well as political speeches, policy documents, and strategic doctrines. My findings show that the breadth and robustness of coalitions of different technological beliefs can facilitate defense indigenization and self-reliance or, conversely, entrench existing dependencies by shaping what is seen as feasible and desirable. This paper challenges mainstream systemic and structural explanations of defense technological self-reliance, while enriching sociological and ideational political economy approaches to military innovation and defense studies. My focus on domestic beliefs opens the black box of decision-making in the Indian defense industry, offering an actor-centric perspective on the conditions and drivers that have shaped varied outcomes of the self-reliance dilemma in conventional weapons procurement. India’s emerging role as a significant security and defense industrial actor especially raises the empirical relevance of this research.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Dynamics of Defense Indigenization: state-private relations in India’s quest for self-reliance</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-dynamics-of-defense-indigenization-state-private-relations-in-india-s-quest-for.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-dynamics-of-defense-indigenization-state-private-relations-in-india-s-quest-for</id>
    <updated>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Yagnyashri Kodaru</name></author><summary>In an era of hostile geopolitics, states of all stripes are striving to fortify domestic defense industries and secure defense supply lines. Despite increasing scholarly attention on national strategies of self-reliance—especially in rising powers in the global south—the concept and its associated policy of ‘defense indigenization’ (DI) remains little understood on a conceptual and empirical level. Notably, authors have studied broad variations in DI policies across states, while neglecting shifts in the roles of state and private actors over time. This fails to account for the complex and puzzling mix of protectionist and open-market liberalization policies that underlie many national DI strategies, warranting a deeper analysis of ongoing reconfigurations in the competencies of key defense industrial players. Using a case study of the Indian defense industry, this paper provides a unique conceptualization of DI that challenges current statist analyses and explores evolving state-private dynamics in contemporary DI approaches. Since 2014, under the Modi government, India has seemingly undergone renewed efforts at indigenization, central to which is the further liberalization of its otherwise state-led defense industry. In a systematic mapping of major weapons production, I track historical developments in DI policy and assess whether the “Make in India” campaign represents a critical juncture in state-private defense industrial relations. The findings suggest that India is on the cusp of major defense industrial transformations in its path to self-reliance, constituting an expanded role for the private sector despite persistent institutional and structural constraints. This empirical mapping can offer valuable insights into the political and industrial drivers of DI in rising powers in the Global South. The paper holds serious policy implications for India and other rising powers’ strategic positioning in the global order, contributing to broader debates in political economy and defense/security studies.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Examining the Factors Behind the EU’s Defence Innovation System</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-examining-the-factors-behind-the-eu-s-defence-innovation-system.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-examining-the-factors-behind-the-eu-s-defence-innovation-system</id>
    <updated>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Cezary Wereszko</name></author><summary>The European Union’s defence innovation ambitions have evolved significantly since the early 2000s, driven by an increasing need for technological sovereignty amid the resurgence of great power competition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further accelerated interest in defence R&amp;D, drawing greater attention from both the public and private sectors within the EU. Taking the supranational perspective, rather than that of individual member states, this paper offers an inquiry into the current state of the European Union’s defence innovation system by examining the different factors shaping its development. External pressures, including the war in Ukraine and the assertive US foreign policy, act as catalytic factors, creating potential for superior defence innovation outcomes. A strong human capital base underpinned by academia and a network of technology hubs also contributes to the development of the defence innovation system. At the other end of the spectrum are the institutional factors. However, institutional constraints, including a complex regulatory environment and rigid public procurement processes, pose challenges to both public and private investment in defence R&amp;D, limiting the EU’s ability to fully leverage its defence innovation potential.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Innovation and engineering at the front: the Ukrainian case of Unmanned Systems</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-innovation-and-engineering-at-the-front-the-ukrainian-case-of-unmanned-systems.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-innovation-and-engineering-at-the-front-the-ukrainian-case-of-unmanned-systems</id>
    <updated>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Emilie Berthelsen</name></author><summary>This paper aims to answer who has been at the centre of the development of Unmanned Systems in Ukraine following February 2022, and how these actors have become organised into constellations that enhance military adaptability. With private actors being central as funders, producers and suppliers of drones, Ukraine demonstrates the contemporary role of the state and the military in guiding and facilitating defence technological innovation. Using a case study approach, it provides an in-depth look at the Ukrainian efforts and challenges of rapidly scaling and localising the production of drones during the war, paying special attention to the role of engineer-soldier collaboration in facilitating continuous development. The Ukrainian example highlights that much of the innovative power is found in start-ups and industries outside the traditional defence-industrial pipeline, necessitating new solutions to bridge the gap. Realising the value of these actors, however, has relied on novel collaboration patterns. Initially, bottom-up initiatives by NGOs and volunteers dominated. While these demonstrated the operational potential of Unmanned Systems, the ad hoc nature hindered scaling. Gearing the bureaucratic infrastructure, including within the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the defence procurement agency, to sustain innovation required new defence industrial strategies and significant changes to processes and organisation, including the formation of the Unmanned Systems Force and industry-platforms like Brave1. This provides an example of large-scale and sustained military innovation in wartime. Studying these constellations of actors that have jointly contributed to the development and deployment of Unmanned Systems showcases concrete mechanisms for enhancing innovative capacity for defence purposes. Based on this empirically grounded examination, I argue that in an unpredictable strategic environment, boosting military adaptability that leverages the potential for rapid development of software-based systems requires the establishment of conduits to ease access for private companies to military feedback and testing prior to tender-based procurement.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Russian Countertrade as a Mechanism for Promoting Arms Sales and Diplomatic Influence</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-russian-countertrade-as-a-mechanism-for-promoting-arms-sales-and-diplomatic-infl.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2025-russian-countertrade-as-a-mechanism-for-promoting-arms-sales-and-diplomatic-infl</id>
    <updated>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2025-06-26T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Jonata Anicetti</name></author>
    <author><name>Shang-Su Wu</name></author>
    <author><name>Ron Matthews</name></author><summary>Why and how does Russia engage in the arms trade? Scholars have largely focused on why Russia participates in the arms trade, often neglecting the equally crucial question of how it conducts this trade. Yet, understanding the mechanisms by which Russia promotes arms sales provides deeper insights into why it does so. While many portray Russia’s arms trade as driven by economic or strategic motivations, few examine the specific tools it employs, particularly defense countertrade, which includes non-monetary barter, counter-purchase obligations, and industrial or technological investments (offsets). This paper fills that gap by offering an eight-decade perspective on Russian arms trade practices, drawing on data and case studies to uncover a more nuanced set of motives. Russia integrates economic and political objectives in its arms trade, seeking not only to outcompete Western suppliers but also to expand or regain influence in various regions, circumvent Western-imposed sanctions, secure access to valuable resources, and sustain its military capabilities. Although barter and technological cooperation have long been part of its trade practices, Russia has only recently adopted offset practices in a systematic way. By leveraging defense countertrade,Moscow aims to stabilize, and potentially grow, its arms exports as global conditions shift.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Defence Offsets and the Global Arms Trade: Explaining Cross-National Variations</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-defence-offsets-and-the-global-arms-trade-explaining-cross-national-variations.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-defence-offsets-and-the-global-arms-trade-explaining-cross-national-variations</id>
    <updated>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Jonata Anicetti</name></author><summary>This book offers the first comprehensive study of defence offsets and its economic, security, political and theoretical implications. Originating in the second half of the 19th century, defence offsets – additional economic, industrial and technological benefits to states for buying foreign weapons – have since been a key feature of the global arms trade and defence industry. And yet, offsets are an underresearched and undertheorised phenomenon. This book fills this gap in the literature by offering the first general theory of defence offsets, as well as the first systematic analysis of the offset phenomenon. By building on the insights of scholars of defence economics and drawing from the International Relations liberal paradigm, as well as reviving and adapting Robert Putnam’s two-level game framework, the book proposes a liberal-rationalist theory of defence offsets. It then proves the worth of such a theory through Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of fifty-four fighter aircraft transfers from 1992 to 2021 inclusive, and three in depth case studies addressing offsets negotiated and agreed to as part of fighter aircraft competitions in Brazil, India and South Korea. This book will be of interest to students of defence studies, defence economics, security studies and International Relations.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Exploring the cybersecurity policy design space in the EU: a mixed methods approach based on machine-learning techniques</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-exploring-the-cybersecurity-policy-design-space-in-the-eu-a-mixed-methods-approa.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-exploring-the-cybersecurity-policy-design-space-in-the-eu-a-mixed-methods-approa</id>
    <updated>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Mattia Sguazzini</name></author><summary>Social scientists are increasingly focusing on the factors that explain the development, organisation, and enforcement of cybersecurity capabilities. However, a systematic analysis of these capabilities in terms of the policy instruments used has not been attempted so far. Which policy instruments can actors use? How do they vary between the institutions? How can the variation in the availability and use of capabilities be explained? This paper aims to answer these research questions using text-as-data techniques to analyse policy documents of EU Member States and European institutions. Reviewing the literature concerning the different phases of cybersecurity policy design, I develop a set of hypotheses within a general theoretical framework. I use mixed methods to cross-validate hypotheses and refine the theoretical framework. The data used are policy documents from 1990 to 2023, sourced from the online libraries of the UN, NATO, EU, and Member States, focusing on the cybersecurity policy sub-areas of Defence, Crime, Diplomacy, and Resilience. The identification of the policy instruments and the actors involved is conducted using Named Entity Recognition (NER) in the documents. Furthermore, I combine NER with a machine-learning method for estimating bureaucratic constraint variation to consider potential effects on implementation. Upon obtaining numerical values that represent the variety and frequency of policy instruments, I assess the consistency of the models corresponding to hypotheses through regression analysis. The findings offer a comparative analysis of state policy instruments within the EU’s supranational framework. The paper’s contributions are threefold: it provides a method for analysing the policies of individual states, considering the influence of supra-national frameworks, replicable in other policy areas; this methodological contribution follows the development of a theoretical framework that combines the literature of IR, policy analysis, IPE, and organisational studies in the field of cybersecurity; and it provides a systematisation of European cybersecurity policy documents.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Strategic sensemaking: Scanning the military technological edge</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-strategic-sensemaking-scanning-the-military-technological-edge.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-strategic-sensemaking-scanning-the-military-technological-edge</id>
    <updated>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Henrik Breitenbauch</name></author>
    <author><name>Jens Vesterlund Mathiesen</name></author><summary>Increased strategic competition over technology puts defence innovation at the forefront of current national security and defence policy strategizing. A central issue in the defence innovation debate is how different types of countries – from advanced major powers such as the US, over catching-up states like China to middling powers such as Russia, Iran and India, and finally to small countries, often advanced innovators like Israel and Singapore – organise their defence innovation systems. Filling a gap in the literature which focuses on either great powers or small but great innovators, this article reconstructs the logic of strategic sensemaking in defence innovation for small states without a particularly strong defence and innovation portfolio. For small states who are unable to either develop advanced defence materiel on their own or to participate in but a few of the leading international (allied and partner) capability development programmes, technology scouting – scanning the military technological edge – is both crucial to their strategic sensemaking. We reconstruct three modes of technology scouting as integral to national defence planning and capability development decision-making. The argument adds to the academic agenda of defence innovation and the global technological aspects of strategic competition, and is relevant to policy makers redesigning defence innovation and materiel policies.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Technological Innovation and national security: Variations in public-private relations in the defense and cybersecurity sectors</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-technological-innovation-and-national-security-variations-in-public-private-rela.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2024-technological-innovation-and-national-security-variations-in-public-private-rela</id>
    <updated>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2024-06-27T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Yagnyashri Kodaru</name></author>
    <author><name>Lorenz Sommer</name></author><summary>In liberal market economies like the US and UK, private actors have come to play an indispensable role in the emergence of robust defense industries and the provision of security. States particularly rely on the private sector in areas of high technological innovation, such as arms production and cybersecurity. While technological innovation and the resulting public reliance on private expertise has been a common denominator, the emergence of public-private relations has been inconsistent across security sectors. Despite ideological parallels between the US and the UK, public-private relationships differ in the degree of consolidation or autonomy, and standardization of practices, between the state and private actors. In this study, we map these variations in the consolidation of relationships between public and private actors, attributing it to differences in institutional legacies and security pressures. Through case studies on the US and the UK, we trace the evolution of public-private dynamics in two security sectors, defense industry and cybersecurity, since end of the Cold War. We find that more entrenched institutional legacies in the military industry have led to a closer, less market-oriented position of private actors and greater dependence on the state through contractual relationships. Conversely, less entrenched institutional legacies in the nascent cybersecurity sector have contributed to a more market-oriented, stronger position of private actors vis a vis the state, as evidenced by ongoing challenges in regulating the private tech industry. Furthermore, we find that the changing nature of security pressures in the cyberspace could push states towards a (re-)integration of this sector into more consolidated defense military pipelines. This paper contributes to the growing literature on public-private-partnerships in security governance and offers insight into the nexus of state security and technological innovation in two historically different, yet connected security policy fields.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Arms Purchases in the Baltic States and Transfers to Ukraine: Balancing National Security Interests</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-arms-purchases-in-the-baltic-states-and-transfers-to-ukraine-balancing-national.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-arms-purchases-in-the-baltic-states-and-transfers-to-ukraine-balancing-national</id>
    <updated>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Donatas Palavenis</name></author><summary>All three Baltic States gained independence in the 1990s and treated Russian Federation with a reservation from early on. The events in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022) revealed a real Russian mindset and geopolitical aspiration. While being NATO members from 2004 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania felt safe, but still invested and continue to invest heavily in national security. All three countries meet NATO’s benchmark for defense spending and even go beyond that figure as the threat remains very close. On one hand, increased budgets allow for the expansion of military capabilities and acquire modern arms for national armies, but on other hand, the need to support Ukraine with arms remains crucial for national security. Most eastern NATO countries treat the fight in Ukraine as a national interest: if Russia will be stopped in Ukraine it will not be capable to inflict any harm on bordering NATO countries. As a result, national decision-makers have to make hard choices on balancing mentioned needs, deciding what particular capabilities need to be transferred to Ukraine, and what capabilities have to be reserved for national needs, to repel Russian aggression. The research results indicate a different national approach being used while balancing national security interests. The US leadership remains the key in coordinating support for Ukraine, setting a premier example in support of Ukraine, encouraging, and pushing other countries to perform.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>EU Arms Collaboration and Procurement: The Impact of the War in Ukraine</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-eu-arms-collaboration-and-procurement-the-impact-of-the-war-in-ukraine.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-eu-arms-collaboration-and-procurement-the-impact-of-the-war-in-ukraine</id>
    <updated>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Jonata Anicetti</name></author><summary>In May 2021, a study commissioned by the European Parliament claimed that most Member States in Eastern Europe are reluctant to engage in intra-EU defence industry cooperation and prefer to buy American military hardware as an integral part of their strategic partnership with the US. Less than one year later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should thus have widened this purported West-East divide. And yet, in March 2022, just a few weeks after the invasion and with the EU busy stimulating MS’ collaborative investments in joint projects and joint procurement of defence capabilities, it was a Western European country such as Germany who suddenly procured three squadrons of US-made F-35 fighter aircraft. In fact, by investigating MS arms collaboration and procurement over the period 2014-2023 through both primary and secondary sources, this paper shows that no such divide exists. When it comes to the procurement of foreign weapons, Western and Eastern MS show similar EU/extra-EU ratios, with France actually buying less European than Hungary. As for arms collaboration, rather than a West-East divide, the findings strongly suggest the existence of a large-small divide within the EU, with smaller MS typically avoiding high-end PESCO projects in favour of defence offsets. Indeed, whereas larger MS can negotiate favourable workshare arrangements, contrary to elsewhere argued, smaller ones do not expect to reap technology transfer benefits from arms collaboration. Overall, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a negative impact on EU defence cooperation. Virtually all new joint development and procurement initiatives have occurred through a NATO framework and may well eventually see the participation of the US, or the procurement of extra-EU weapons. Moreover, EU defence supply chains expand (e.g. US, Israel) and extend (e.g. South Korea) considerably, thus putting into further question EU defence cooperation as well as EU strategic autonomy more broadly.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Engine or Brake? The Franco-German Couple and the Future of the European Defence Industry</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-engine-or-brake-the-franco-german-couple-and-the-future-of-the-european-defence.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-engine-or-brake-the-franco-german-couple-and-the-future-of-the-european-defence</id>
    <updated>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Antonio Calcara</name></author><summary>The future of Europe&#39;s defense industry hinges on greater cooperation between France and Germany. France and Germany agree on the need to integrate the European defense market to effectively compete with the US and other external powers. However, they have different preferences on how to organize the European defense market. Why? We argue that the distinction between the two faces of market size - the first exclusively related to defense, the second including the broader commercial-industrial base - is key to understanding convergence and divergence in Franco-German approaches to defense-industrial cooperation. France and Germany share a general interest in European defense market integration. However, because each country has a relative advantage in one of the faces of market size, we expect them to feature different - even opposing - views towards defense industrial cooperation. Germany is less competitive than France in the first face of the market size (defense) but more competitive in the second (commercial). It will therefore seek to inject efficiency into EU-level initiatives aimed to integrate the European defense market because it calculates that it can benefit more than France over the long-term, thanks to its commercial-industrial edge. At the same time, Germany would protect its less competitive defense industry from France by championing autonomy in the context of ad-hoc arms programs. In turn, France would prefer to leverage its first-face advantage by injecting efficiency into arms programs to take the lion’s share of the project. Conversely, we expect France to protect its autonomy in the context of EU initiatives that could bring about defense integration and benefit the more competitive German commercial-industrial base. To test our argument, we examine French and German preferences towards two important EU initiatives in recent years: the European Defense Fund and the Future Combat Air System.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The US Hegemony Dilemma and European Missile Production</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-us-hegemony-dilemma-and-european-missile-production.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2023-the-us-hegemony-dilemma-and-european-missile-production</id>
    <updated>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2023-06-22T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Lucas Hellemeier</name></author><summary>Thanks to its unparalleled defense budget, the United States possesses a comparative advantage in arms production. This confronts US allies with the US hegemony dilemma, a trade-off between efficiency and autonomy. Allies can procure comparably cheap high-end weaponry from US sources instead of securing more costly autonomy in arms supply. Overall, US defense industrial market power forces its allies to specialize in arms production, thus, to decide what kinds of weapon systems to produce on their own. Given this need to specialize caused by US hegemony in the defense industrial order, what explains US allies&#39; defense industrial specialization? I confine my analysis to Europe since it represents an especially interesting case with its unparalleled regional economic and political integration and its relationship to the US shaped by geostrategic cooperation on the one hand, and industrial competition on the other hand. Furthermore, I focus on the missile sector, a rather understudied arms production sector compared to fighter aircraft and drones. I argue that since the US is the structural constraint that sets the conditions under which European defense industries operate Europeans seek to strike a balance between efficiency, i.e., buying American, autonomy, i.e., producing nationally, and cooperation. I leverage market size, understood as the national market but also the market countries expect to sell to, as the central variable explaining European missile production decisions. These production and export decisions have important political implications because they shape countries&#39; foreign policies decisively. According to conventional wisdom, a country&#39;s grand strategy shapes its defense industrial policy. I argue that this causal relationship is more complicated and that a country&#39;s defense industrial policy has a profound effect on its grand strategy.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>&#39;Aiding and Assisting&#39; Atrocity Crimes? Britain&#39;s Prevention Paradox in Yemen</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2022-aiding-and-assisting-atrocity-crimes-britain-s-prevention-paradox-in-yemen"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-aiding-and-assisting-atrocity-crimes-britain-s-prevention-paradox-in-yemen</id>
    <updated>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Gillian McKay</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits and Implications</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-cyber-arms-transfer-meaning-limits-and-implications.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-cyber-arms-transfer-meaning-limits-and-implications</id>
    <updated>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Max Smeets</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>European Arms Collaboration All at Sea? Competition and Co-operation Over Global Naval Exports</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2022-european-arms-collaboration-all-at-sea-competition-and-co-operation-over-global"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-european-arms-collaboration-all-at-sea-competition-and-co-operation-over-global</id>
    <updated>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Brendan Flynn</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Why States Arm – and Why They Sometimes Do So Together</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-why-states-arm-and-why-they-sometimes-do-so-together.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2022-why-states-arm-and-why-they-sometimes-do-so-together</id>
    <updated>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2022-06-30T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Ulrich Krotz</name></author>
    <author><name>Jonata Anicetti</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2022. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Arms Without Influence? Defense Industrial Policy and Burden-Sharing in the Transatlantic Community</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-arms-without-influence-defense-industrial-policy-and-burden-sharing-in-the-trans.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-arms-without-influence-defense-industrial-policy-and-burden-sharing-in-the-trans</id>
    <updated>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Jordan Becker</name></author><summary>The allocation of resources and the sharing of defense burdens among members of the transatlantic security community is central to the defense of the liberal international order. It is also a fundamental component of that order in itself. While economists have shed light on variation in burden-sharing behavior among states and measured as top-line defense spending, only qualitative work in the security studies field has addressed the nature of contributions to shared priorities. Neither field has explicitly addressed spending on modernizing defense capabilities, which is of primary interest to policy-makers aiming to mitigate burden-shifting tendencies in alliances. I find the larger the weight of arms production is in its national economy, the more a state spends on shared transatlantic priorities. This finding suggests that the strategic effects of defense industrial policy, and particularly the distribution of defense industries across Europe, extend beyond the production of defense articles and into the politics of burden sharing. The finding is robust to multiple statistical modeling choices. It also finds support from primary source archival evidence and participant interviews.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>European Naval Procurement under Global Competition: Why So Underwhelming and Should We Think of It as Even &#39;European&#39;?</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-european-naval-procurement-under-global-competition-why-so-underwhelming-and-sho.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-european-naval-procurement-under-global-competition-why-so-underwhelming-and-sho</id>
    <updated>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Brendan Flynn</name></author><summary>This paper explores different trajectories of European co-operation for naval procurement, which has become topical with the, much touted, merger of French and Italian shipyards to create a ‘naval airbus’ since 2017. What is interesting here is the absence of a Franco-German nexus at the centre of industrial defence collaboration, even if what has been agreed as of 2019 is a much more limited joint venture. Indeed, European shipyards and naval systems integrators, as well as the naval procurement planning process more generally, remain, with a few interesting exceptions, stubbornly national. Consolidation of yards and related firms has only been patchy at the European level. Instead, European naval procurement is dominated by de facto national monopolies offering at the global and European level, rival ships, sensors and weapon fits. Also, examined are collaborative naval projects brokered by OCCAR, the EDA and now PESCO. What do their naval projects reveal and in particular why does the naval sector appear to offer less successful examples of collaborative procurement compared to land or air sectors? In particular, what theoretical perspectives can shed light on this situation: is the relative weakness of European naval procurement due to the absence of a shared culture among European naval-industry elites, intense national institutional path dependencies, or conflict over shares of the global export trade in naval armaments? The argument of the paper stresses the importance of global contracts, competition and markets all of which serve to challenge the logic of any strictly European naval defence co-operation emerging in preference for a more traditional dependence on semi-captive national markets combined also with increasingly non-European global partnerships.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Opening the Black Box of Defence Procurement and Planning Processes: What Drives India to Develop International Defence Partnerships?</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-opening-the-black-box-of-defence-procurement-and-planning-processes-what-drives.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-opening-the-black-box-of-defence-procurement-and-planning-processes-what-drives</id>
    <updated>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Nicolas Blarel</name></author><summary>How does India identify and select its partners for security cooperation? Why does India develop defense partnerships in specialized areas with certain countries and not others? Which national institutions actually make those choices and then enact cooperation policies? The extant scholarship has looked at different explanations. Some studies concentrate on defense planning priorities such as the need to balance against China and Pakistan, and have mostly noted how the present Indian defence procurement process has led to sub-optimal outcomes in light of these strategic goals and in spite of growing financial means of a rising power like India. Other scholars have looked at how India’s strategic autonomy has led it to develop a robust indigenous defense industry but highlighted how the country remains has remained heavily reliant on defence imports, in spite of a strong political willingness supporting indigenization. Building on this, this paper looks more specifically at the role of sub-state organizations (SSOs) which are part of the official government machinery but have arguably developed some degree of agency to devise and implement defense partnerships over specific platforms with international partners. For the purposes of this study, this paper concentrates on the role of SSOs in three cases of defense procurement and/or joint ventures: the Rafale multi-role fighter jet (France), the BrahMos missiles (Russia), and the Barak AMD systems (Israel).</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The Proliferation of Military Drones in Europe – Not So Easy, Not So Cheap, but NATO and the EU Can Help</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-the-proliferation-of-military-drones-in-europe-not-so-easy-not-so-cheap-but-nato.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-the-proliferation-of-military-drones-in-europe-not-so-easy-not-so-cheap-but-nato</id>
    <updated>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Dominika Kunertova</name></author><summary>Unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, have gained a prominent place in transforming remotely the character of military warfare. This paper looks at the surprisingly under-studied European drone landscape. While the Security and Strategic Studies scholars and practitioners debate vigorously the legal and ethical aspects of armed drone strikes and the consequences of their proliferation for the international stability, this paper qualitatively assesses the different layers of drone proliferation dynamics in Europe to shed light on the often-invisible role of NATO and the EU in the diffusion of military technology. As European countries have been having immense problems with developing their own advanced drones in the past 20 years, this paper argues that NATO, through its military logic, and the EU, via its market logic, can channel national capability development efforts by offering R&#92;&amp;D funding, generating expertise, supporting procurement and maintenance, regulating airspace integration, and even acquiring the lacking capabilities on behalf of their member countries. These findings contribute to the capacity-based theories of military technology diffusion by showing how NATO and the EU can help countries overcome the platform and adoption challenges posed by advanced military unmanned technology.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Dual-use Goods?</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-what-do-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-dual-use-goods.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2021-what-do-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-dual-use-goods</id>
    <updated>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2021-09-03T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Ana Sánchez Cobaleda</name></author><summary>The definition of any issue subject to regulation appears to be one of the first steps necessary to achieve an efficient regulatory framework. In international law, however, it is not unusual to find concepts that still lack a universally accepted definition. This is precisely the case of the notion this contribution deals with: dual-use goods. Although this notion has a considerably extended international regulation in the frame of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) – due to its relevance from both the commercial and development angle as well as the security perspective -, the lack of consensus when defining it entails some of the challenges which will be set out in this paper. In the absence of a legally complete and homogeneous definition, which is intrinsically difficult to achieve at present, we should not disregard the fact that the different approaches contained in the treaties and agreements regulating the non-proliferation of WMDs have managed to be accepted by a considerable majority of States that agree on the way of identifying this type of items. For this reason, this paper analyses how legally binding and soft-law sources of the current WMD non-proliferation regime (international treaties, export control regime guidelines, and UNSC Resolutions), approach dual-use goods and technologies. The analysis also classifies the different rules and regulations currently in force based on the criterion they employ to define the potential uses of these strategic items: peaceful vs. non-peaceful dichotomy, civil vs. military dichotomy and the intentionality criterion. The paper thus contributes to outline the legal borders within which the concept of “dual-use goods” is currently framed, it analyses how the existence of multiple criteria to define such items affects their international control and it makes possible to understand the evolution that this notion may undergo in the near future; an evolution capable of calling into question the standards of legal certainty that the international regime of dual-use items provides in this regard.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Between Power and Plenty: The New EU Defense-Industrial Initiatives and the Transatlantic Relationship</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2019-between-power-and-plenty-the-new-eu-defense-industrial-initiatives-and-the-trans"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-between-power-and-plenty-the-new-eu-defense-industrial-initiatives-and-the-trans</id>
    <updated>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Antonio Calcara</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Exports of Second-Hand Arms: Increasing the Competition for Arms Producing Firms</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2019-exports-of-second-hand-arms-increasing-the-competition-for-arms-producing-firms"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-exports-of-second-hand-arms-increasing-the-competition-for-arms-producing-firms</id>
    <updated>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Eva Ziegler</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The Political Economy of Drones on the European Defense Market</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2019-the-political-economy-of-drones-on-the-european-defense-market"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-the-political-economy-of-drones-on-the-european-defense-market</id>
    <updated>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Dominika Kunertova</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Understanding the Politics of European Naval Procurement: Always Just Beyond the Horizon?</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2019-understanding-the-politics-of-european-naval-procurement-always-just-beyond-the"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2019-understanding-the-politics-of-european-naval-procurement-always-just-beyond-the</id>
    <updated>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2019-06-13T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Brendan Flynn</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2019. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Arms Procurement, Transfers and Defense Industries as a Means of Gaining Autonomy: The Case of the Gulf States</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2018-arms-procurement-transfers-and-defense-industries-as-a-means-of-gaining-autonomy"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-arms-procurement-transfers-and-defense-industries-as-a-means-of-gaining-autonomy</id>
    <updated>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Emma Soubrier</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in European Defense Procurement: the “Italian Job”</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-cooperation-and-non-cooperation-in-european-defense-procurement-the-italian-job.html"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-cooperation-and-non-cooperation-in-european-defense-procurement-the-italian-job</id>
    <updated>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Antonio Calcara</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Informal Institutions, Trust and the Design of Privatization</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2018-informal-institutions-trust-and-the-design-of-privatization"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-informal-institutions-trust-and-the-design-of-privatization</id>
    <updated>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Moritz Weiss</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Producing Airpower: Neo-Liberalism and Complex Weaponry</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2018-producing-airpower-neo-liberalism-and-complex-weaponry"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-producing-airpower-neo-liberalism-and-complex-weaponry</id>
    <updated>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Marc R. DeVore</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The Metamorphosis of ‘Capability’: British Defense Equipment Support Policy Since 2010</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2018-the-metamorphosis-of-capability-british-defense-equipment-support-policy-since-2"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2018-the-metamorphosis-of-capability-british-defense-equipment-support-policy-since-2</id>
    <updated>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2018-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Benoit Giry</name></author>
    <author><name>Andy Smith</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2018. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A Science and Technology Studies Approach to Drone Politics in Europe</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2017-a-science-and-technology-studies-approach-to-drone-politics-in-europe"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-a-science-and-technology-studies-approach-to-drone-politics-in-europe</id>
    <updated>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Samuel Longuet</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Arms Procurement in the Gulf Region: Evolving Trends and Implications for the Client State–Supplying State–Industry Triangle</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2017-arms-procurement-in-the-gulf-region-evolving-trends-and-implications-for-the-cli"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-arms-procurement-in-the-gulf-region-evolving-trends-and-implications-for-the-cli</id>
    <updated>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Emma Soubrier</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>New Wine in Old Bottles? United Kingdom Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the post-Brexit Era</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2017-new-wine-in-old-bottles-united-kingdom-defence-procurement-and-defence-industrie"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-new-wine-in-old-bottles-united-kingdom-defence-procurement-and-defence-industrie</id>
    <updated>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Dr. Benedict Wilkinson</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>States vs. Markets in Rising Powers: Functional and Political Sources of Institutional Resilience in India’s Defense Sector</title>
    <link href="https://eiss-europa.com/anthology.html?view=papers#paper-2017-states-vs-markets-in-rising-powers-functional-and-political-sources-of-instituti"/>
    <id>https://eiss-europa.com/papers/2017-states-vs-markets-in-rising-powers-functional-and-political-sources-of-instituti</id>
    <updated>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</updated>
    <published>2017-06-15T12:00:00Z</published>
    <category term="Arms acquisition and transfer"/>
    <author><name>Dr. Moritz Weiss</name></author><summary>Presented at EISS 2017. No abstract on file yet.</summary>
  </entry>
</feed>
